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JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF HOSPITAL
INDEPENDENT DUTY OF CARE TO PATIENTS:
HANNOLA v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD

O

I.

INTRODUCTION

N MARCH 27, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Dis-

trict of Ohio announced its decision in Hannola v. City of Lakewood,'
establishing that a hospital owes its patients an independent duty of
care to see that its physicians are both carefully selected and responsibly retained on the medical staff. Of equal importance, the decision
established that a hospital which holds itself out as the provider ab initio of services such as emergency medical care has a special responsibility to look at the quality of those services. Thus, according to the
Hannola decision, the hospital stands as the party responsible to the patient should those services be rendered negligently by a physician who
is not an employee. This Note will examine the court's rationale in Hannola and the previous leading Ohio case on emergency room care,
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity.! This Note will similarly examine "control"
tests of employment, the concept of apparent authority and the series of
cases on independent duty of care which have been decided in the
eleven years between Cooper and Hannola. It is the conclusion of this
Note that the Hannola decision is more consistent with the realities of
employment and service in the health care industry, and that the public
policy arguments presented by the court require significant modifications in decisional rationale for medical negligence cases.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE LAW BEFORE COOPER

Medical care today is a complex enterprise, and hospitals are frequently multimillion dollar institutions,' but this has not always been so.
The economic changes which have occured in the health services industry are paralleled by developments in medical negligence law and, in
general, the former have preceded the latter. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, hospitals were largely charitable institutions, offering themselves as repositories for the seriously ill. They were the "doctor's work-shop" and not the service institutions of today, and were afforded charitable immunity for their torts.4
' Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (8th Dist.
1980), cert. denied, No. 80-804 (Ohio Sup. Ct., Sept. 12, 1980).
27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
The statement is probably modest. One study pegged the volume of
investor-owned hospital income at $10 billion for 1979, and rising steadily. 12
FED'N AM. HosP. REV. 20 (1979).

' An excellent overview of the charitable immunity doctrine and its role in
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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As individual hospitals grew in size during post-Civil War industrialization and expansion of urban centers, the number of
employees of hospitals also grew. Some, inevitably, were less careful
than others, and injuries to patients or visitors occurred. But for their
charitable immunity, hospitals could have been made to answer for
employee torts, since the principles of vicarious liability-holding an
employer or "master" responsible for the torts of his employee or "servant"-were well-established.5 The problem with charitable immunity
was that hospital employees were protected from suit whether they
were rendering health care-the original purpose of the hospital-or
performing some nonmedical act which might in another business subject them to liability.
This problem was resolved in 1914 by Justice Cardozo's famous opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals In Schloendorff,
Justice Cardozo pronounced that there should be a modification in the
charitable immunity doctrine to permit a degree of accountability by the
hospital when one of its servants caused injury while acting in a noncharitable function. The distinction Justice Cardozo proposed is no
longer the law of New York, and has been subject to unremitting criticism;7 still, it was novel for the time. Since the charitable purpose of the
hospital was to care for the sick, liability should not attach when an
employee tort occured in that context. Thus, Justice Cardozo spoke in
terms of both medical acts and administrative acts for which a hospital
might be sued as any other employer. He specifically noted that physicians and nurses were medical actors, and did not conform to accepted
criteria for "servants."8 Therefore, their negligent acts would not be imputed to the hospital.
The idea that physicians and nurses were "special" survived the
Schloendorff opinion, although the original distinction blurred in other
jurisdictions. In Indiana, it took on a curious twist: Since the hospital
was a charitable res, it could not practice medicine, as licensed physicians could. Therefore, it could not, by definition, ever be vicariously
liable for the negligence of physicians, even if physicians received wages
health care appears in Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physician Malpractice, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 953, 954-56 (1973).
1 In the context of this Note the following notions pertain: A servant is in the
service of a master, and performs work for him, and is controlled by the master,
or is subject to his control. An independent contractor contracts with an
employer to work, but the employer does not control the work, nor does he have
the right to control it. A master is liable for the torts of his servants committed
within the scope of the servant's employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 2, 2(1), 2(3), 219(1) (1957).
6 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
Overruled in 1957 by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
1 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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from the hospital, because the physician (servant) was performing an act
which the hospital (master) could not.'
In other models of negligence law, recognition of the special character
of the provider of health services appeared. In some jurisdictions,
nurses lost their protection as "special" people and reverted to mere
employee status."0 Other cases held that a hospital might be liable for a
physician's negligence if it knew he was incompetent to perform his
duties, or if the hospital attempted to dictate to him how care should be
given."
It became clear, early on, that courts would not permit the physician
and hospital to mutually shield each other from liability. In passing on
the question of liability for physician negligence where the patients
were referred thereto by the hospital, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the hospital, too, was liable. In Giusti v. C.H. Weston Co., a
hospital executed a contract with third parties to furnish medical care
to a group. The members of the group who sought care were referred to
the subject physician. The court held that while the negligence of the
physician might ordinarily be personal to him, the hospital here assumed
a role closer to that of employer than disinterested party, and that this
role would subject the hospital to suit also.'" This result took on special
significance where a corporation set up employee accident plans utilizing the services of local hospitals, as in Jenkins v. Charleston General
Hospital." While the defendant-physician in Jenkins was otherwise an
independent contractor, he became an agent of the hospital when he
treated injured workers of a company with whom the hospital had contracted."
By these decisions the breakdown of classical negligence concepts visa-vis physicians began. There had been no showing of the hospitals'
knowledge of physician incompetence, nor proof that the hospital dictated treatment methods to him. Nevertheless, the courts "found" agency.
It was not surprising that other "agency" relationships were deduced
by courts from what had theretofore been clearly independent choses.
Preeminent among these cases is Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of
Chiropractic,6 and it appears to be the first example of apparent
authority used as a decisional rationale. The plaintiff was injured in an
auto accident, and a decision was made to take X-rays of his back. For

10
"

Herman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
Piedmount Hospital v. Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491, 16 S.E.2d 90 (1930).
Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 209, 117 S.E. 103 (1923).
165 Or. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941).

Id. at 530, 108 P.2d at 1013.
90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922).
,5 Id. at 233, 110 S.E. at 561.
54 Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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this purpose, he was taken to a private physician, who maintained an office in the defendant hospital. There was no indication that the physician was not an employee or functionary of the hospital, although evidence was presented that clearly affirmed his independent contractor
status. The physician failed to obtain the proper films, and the plaintiff
was not adequately treated. The hospital was estopped from invoking
the physician's independent contractor status in their defense. The
court held that the patient's testimony that he knew he was in a
hospital, and his belief that he was being attended by hospital
employees while in the radiologist's office, was enough to create an
ostensible agency."
In another case, Senaris v. Haas,8 the relationship between physician
and hospital was not obvious to the plaintiff until after the tort, but an
agency relationship was still "found." An anesthesiologist practiced in a
single hospital in company with six other anesthesiologists. The
anesthesiologist billed patients for his services, but obtained all of his
drugs from the hospital, maintained an office there and was subject to
on-call duty by the hospital. These contacts were sufficient to make him
an agent of the hospital, and his fault was attributed to it.' 9
Apparent authority-the creation of "ostensible" agents-did not
2
an emergency room
fare well everywhere. In Dickinson v. Mailliard,
physician in Iowa worked in only one hospital, was a full-time staff
member and had no other practice. The physician was not distinguishably an independent contractor. Nevertheless, he was not considered an
agent of the hospital when he negligently treated the plaintiff.' In a
similar situation, a physician who was a member of a partnership which
had contracted with the defendant hospital to supply emergency room
services was clearly an independent contractor, even though the patients he served had no indication that he was not a hospital employee. 2
Other changes were occurring in the courts' treatment of medical
negligence cases. The stirrings of enterprise liability were felt in the
23
where all the members of a
famous case of Ybarra v. Spangard,
surgical team were held accountable for an injury which was clearly the
result of improper positioning during surgery. Yet, if there was the
assumption that the hospital was a guarantor of results for all acts
within its walls, there were plenty of cases which demonstrated that no

Id at 147, 128 P.2d at 708.
45 Cal. 2d 811, 292 P.2d 915 (1955).
, Id. at 831, 292 P.2d at 925.
175 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1970).
Id at 595.
Pogue v. Hospital Authority of DeKalb County, 120 Ga. App. 230, 170
S.E.2d 53 (1969).
23 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1945).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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matter how gross the negligence of the attending physician, the hospital
would not be held accountable for his torts absent proof of actual
24
knowledge or "control.
The Schloendorff case fostered innovative thought about medical negligence law. With time, it created a muddle for the New York courts as
they decided which acts were administrative and which were medical.
In 1957, the courts, having been through enough gymnastics, overruled
Schoendorff in Bing v. Thunig.2" Bing accomplished two major feats.
First, it removed physicians and nurses from their protected position. 6
was a full-service institution, and
Second, it recognized that the hospital
7
not the charitable shelter of yore.1
The Bing decision provoked an incisive look at the "new" hospital,
which was more like a business than a charity. This new perspective did
not change the postulate that an individual physician's negligence might
not necessarily impute to the hospital. However, in a series of cases
decided in the interim between Bing and Cooper,8 courts began to examine how the hospital held itself out to the public.
Typical of this focus was Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hospital.' In
Vanaman, an injured child was negligently treated by an emergency
room physician, and a painful and serious infection resulted. The
treating physician was not a hospital employee, but he was a staff physician who took his turn in the emergency department. He received no
money from the hospital. All billing of patients was done by the physician under his name. In a novel opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court
looked at the facts from the patient's viewpoint and perceived that the
physician had the appearance of a hospital employee." The court
declared that the representations and omissions of the hospital would
have to be considered in making decisions about agency, and that the
matter of the physician's source of income could not alone determine his
relationship with the hospital.3
It is this new factor-the hospital's representations to the publicwhich assumes an important role in subsequent cases, including Hannola. What the hospitals say and do with respect to their physicians,
24 See, e.g., Clary v. Hospital Authority, 106 Ga. App. 134, 126 S.E.2d 470
(1962) (use of improper equipment to perform elective bronchoscope exam in infant, where hospital staff had knowledge of plans to proceed, and where, after
seriously injuring child, no indication was given to parents of injury; held,
negligence not to be imputed to hospital).
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
2 Id. at 660, 143 N.E.2d at 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
Id. at 558, 143 N.E.2d at 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970).
30 Id. at 722.
31 Id.
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especially in those instances where serious matters of competence are in
question, become increasingly fundamental considerations. The balance
of this discussion, then, will consider how two separate Ohio courts considered hospital representations and decided two similar fact situations
very differently. The difference between those decisions represents
another recognition by the courts of the changing role of the hospital,
and the concomitant changing responsibility which must be accepted for
assuring quality medical care.
III.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND "CONTROL"
THE COOPER CASE

TESTS-

The Ohio Supreme Court settled the question of hospital liability for
emergency room physician negligence with the 1971 case of Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity.2 The thrust of Cooper was that emergency room
physicians are independent contractors, absent some manner of classical
"control" by the hospital.3 This argument was employed by the hospital
defendant in the Hannola case as justification for dismissing the case
against the hospital, even if the emergency room physician was
negligent. 4
An analysis of the Cooper opinion suggests, however, that the Ohio
Supreme Court did not consider all the facts of the pecuniary relationships in the case when arriving at its decision. A further argument can
be made that the Cooper opinion is no longer timely because of society's
changed expectations of hospital emergency service. Thus, it is appropriate that the law should also change.
In Cooper the decedent had been riding a bicycle when struck by a
truck. 5 Later that day the decedent complained of a slight headache,
and vomited periodically after the accident. His mother accompanied
him to the Good Samaritan Hospital emergency room where he was
seen by one Dr. Hansen. 6 The patient was given a cursory physical
examination. Certain key tests, including opthalmoscopic examination of
the eyes and neurologic examinations, were not undertaken. A skull
X-ray, however, revealed no sign of fracture. 7 Dr. Hansen discharged
Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
Id. at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104. "Appellee Dr. Hansen was an employee of appellee Emergency Professional Service Group, and was not under the control of
the hospital." Id
- Brief for Appellant at 9, 10, 13, Hannola v. City of Lakewood, No. 80-804
(Ohio Sup. Ct., filed May 28, 1980).
3 27 Ohio St. 2d at 242, 272 N.E.2d at 97.
" Id. at 243, 272 N.E.2d at 98. Plaintiff made out an issue of apparent authority
here, although it is evident that she also raised the question of traditionallymanifested agency. I& at 249, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
" The combined body of evidence- headache, vomiting and subsequent instability of gait-pointed to a closed head injury, since there was no X-ray
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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the boy, and told Cooper's mother to put him to bed, but to be sure he
could be awakened every hour for a few hours. She was told to bring
him back to the hospital if she could not awaken him." The child did not
fall asleep at home; he remained alert until early the next morning,
when he became restless and suddenly died. 9 An autopsy was performed,
and the cause of death was determined to be hemorrhage, with intracranial pressure damage; a basilar skull fracture was also found."0
Mrs. Cooper brought wrongful death actions against Dr. Hansen, the
emergency room physician and the Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.,
doing business as Good Samaritan Hospital. Also joined as defendants
were an unincorporated association of Good Samaritan staff physicians,
the Emergency Professional Service Group and that group's director,
Dr. Weber." The theory put forward by the plaintiff to hold the hospital
liable was that "the Sisters of Charity had represented to appellant
[plaintiff], and to the public, that the persons rendering medical care in
the emergency room were doing so on behalf of the hospital .... ,42
The case proceeded to trial, and at the close of plaintiff's evidence, a
defense motion for a directed verdict as to all defendants was
sustained. 3 Much of the trial judge's opinion goes to fact questions on
the issue of decedent's probability of survival. 44 The trial court's conclusion of law stated (without more) that the defendant Emergency Professional Services Group controlled the rendering of "professional medical
services available at the emergency room and rendered to plaintiff's
decedent,"4 and that the Sisters of Charity did not control these services.
evidence (at the initial examination) of a fracture or "open" injury. The omitted
tests would arguably have pointed to an increase in intracranial pressure, which
was determined at autopsy to be the cause of death. While the condition is extremely dangerous, it is not uniformly fatal, and surgical decompression by
means of burr holes in the skull is often life-saving. Unfortunately, it is frequently
difficult to assess the likelihood of survival after the patient's death, as is apparent from the Cooper opinion. Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 103. See generally W.
COLLINS, J. VANGILDER, J. VENES & J. GALICICH, Neurological Surgery, in PRINCIPALS OF SURGERY 1635-41 (Schwartz ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Neurological
Surgery].

1 27 Ohio St. 2d at 244,272 N.E.2d at 98. The object of this regimen was to ascertain levels of consciousness, which-in some instances-gradually fade with increasing intracranial pressure. Id. See Neurological Surgery, supra note 37, at
1636. In this instance, the exception proved to be the rule, and there was a rapid
turn of events with immediate death.
" 27 Ohio St. 2d at 244, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
40 Id.

Id. at 245, 246, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
at 246, 247, 272 N.E.2d at 100.
Id. at 248, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
4 Id. at 247, 248, 272 N.E.2d at 102.
" Id. at 249, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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The bulk of the Ohio Supreme Court opinion and the syllabus of the
case focus on the trial issue of decedent's survival and the evidence required to overcome a summary judgment on this question. 6 On the matter
of Good Samaritan's liability for Dr. Hansen's negligence, the court was
parsimonous in its pronouncement: "Appellee Dr. Hansen was an
employee of appellee Emergency Professional Service Group, and was
not under the control of the hospital."4 The court appears to refer, in
this section, to traditional master-servant control standards. On the
more precise issue of apparent authority, arising from plaintiff's claim
of the hospital's representations about its emergency service,48 the opinion is no more protracted: "[Tihe practice of medicine by a licensed
physician in a hospital is not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel,
as alleged by appellant. Nowhere is induced reliance shown by the appellant, as required by Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio
St. 584, 26 0.0. 161, to establish such a relationship." 49 Neither of these
conclusions appear in the syllabus of the case.5"
The initial point of departure from the Cooper case with those which
have come after it (including Hannola)is that the defendant, Dr. Hansen,
was a member of an "unincorporated association."5 Ohio law permitted
physicians to form professional corporations in 1971.12 The opinion notes
that this association was formed in 1965 to run the emergency depart" Id. at 242, 253-54, 272 N.E.2d at 97, 104.
Id. at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
41 Id. at 246, 247, 272 N.E.2d at 100.
17

49

Id.

I The absence of these conclusions from the syllabus was a point of law raised
by the plaintiff in the Hannola case. Brief for Appellees at 22, Hannola v. City of
Lakewood, No. 80-804 (Ohio Sup. Ct., May 28, 1980). Under the syllabus rule, the
quotations set forth there are considered dicta, and not to be construed as a
holding of the court. Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967).
51 27 Ohio St. 2d at 245, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.02 (Page 1978), provides for the incorporation
of individuals who are licensed by the state to perform professional services. The

courts specifically include physicians (and specifically excluded lawyers) under
this statute, as construed by Cleveland Clinic v. Sombrio, 6 Ohio Misc. 48, 215
N.E.2d 740 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1966). Physicians acting as the agents or officers of professional associations (professional corporations) of physicians
organized under § 1785.02, and who are negligent within the scope of their agency
to the association, impute their negligence to the association under vicarious
liability principles. Lenhart v. Toledo Urology Assoc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 249, 356
N.E.2d 749 (1975); accord, Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 22 N.C. App. 544, 207
S.E.2d 267, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); see also
O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 888 (6th
Cir. 1969) (professional employee of a professional association is still liable to his
patients for his own negligence, and his affiliation with the association does not

subject a stockholder of the association to more than the stockholder's limited
liability under general corporation law principles).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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ment 5" and that the association members were also Good Samaritan staff
members in 1965 and subsequent thereto. The "agreement" of the
association with the hospital was oral, and never reduced to writing.'
The function of Dr. Weber, the "director," was to schedule physicians to
serve; if a particular person did not show up at the assigned time,
hospital personnel were to call Dr. Weber and he would find a substitute.55 His duties, then, were much less than either a corporate officer
or a professional partnership member.
The court stated that Dr. Hansen was not controlled by the hospital
because he was employed by the Emergency Professional Services
Group," and was paid by them.5 7 However, the Group did not bill patients directly-the hospital billed its emergency patients, and then
paid the Group, which in turn paid Hansen.58 Yet, if this was true, the
unincorporated association was not a profit-making enterprise 9 for that
would have made it a de facto partnership, and all the members of the
association would have been subject to suit." The Group, if anything,
was an illusion. It is apparent that Hansen's entire income derived from
the emergency practice, and the Group functioned as a bookkeeping
middleman between the provider of services (Hansen) and the purchaser
of those services (Good Samaritan)." It is this set of facts which render
the court's use of traditional employment tests inappropriate.
I Brief for Appellants at 56, Hannola v. City of Lakewood, No. 80-804 (Ohio
Sup. Ct., May 28, 1980).
Id at 57.
Id at 59-60.
27 Ohio St. 2d at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
'7

Id

at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.

58 Id
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1745.01 (Page 1978), sets forth the statutes dealing
with unincorporated associations, and specifically provides that one may sue and
be sued. The leading case construing this section, Lyons v. American Legion, 172
Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961), held that one might have a judgment satisfied
from the assets of the association, or from assets of an individual member
thereof, but not both. This result obtains only in the instance of a not-for-profit
association; the court noted that an association-for-profit is nothing more or less
than a partnership, whose members are liable, as partners, for the torts of
members acting within the partnership business. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 13,
15 (1969).
60UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 13, 15 (1969) (partners jointly and severally
liable for the tortious acts of partners occurring within scope of partnership
business).
6" The fact that the defendant physician was a member of one hospital did not
preclude his membership in another, nor did it bar him from working there. It
was common at one time to have "circuit riding" emergency room physicians who
worked at several hospitals. This arrangement is less common as a result of the
emergence of emergency room professional corporations which usually negotiate
an "exclusive" contract with a particular hospital.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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3
were used
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital2 and Councell v. Douglas"
by the court as authority for the proposition that liability is imputable
to the party who has control of another in an employment setting.
Councell enumerates the definitive test of vicarious liability in Ohio:

The relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is
distinguished from the relationship of employer and independent contractor by the following test: Did the employer retain
control of, or the right to control, the mode and manner of doing
the work contracted for? If he did, the relationship is that of
principal and agent or master and servant. If he did not but is
interested merely in the ultimate result to be accomplished, the
6
"
relationship is that of employer and independent contractor.
Since this test will disclose whether one of two individuals is a servant's
master (as opposed to an independent contractor's employer), it should
also identify where the liability of the servant should lie.6 5 In the Cooper
case, however, there was no master, and no servant. This follows from
the test, because no one was "controlling" Dr. Hansen. Thus, it is
patently inconsistent for the court to call him an employee of the
Emergency Professional Services Group by the Councell definition of
employee. Accordingly, it is inconsistent to say he is an independent
contractor with respect to the hospital. The Councell test produces that
result even if Dr. Hansen was paid a salary by the hospital and served
only the hospital. This result follows because the hospital would not
have control, nor the right to control, the "mode and manner of doing
the work contracted for."6 That is the analytical error in the Cooper opinion-the control test of employment does not work for medical
negligence cases.
The Cooper court's reliance on Avellone was similarly inappropriate.
The cited passage from Avellone notes that
we are not deciding that persons working in a hospital, such as
doctors and nurses, under circumstances where the hospital has
62 165

Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).

" 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955).
Id. (emphasis added).
5 A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service, and whose
conduct is controlled or "subject to the right to control" by the master. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957). If the servant commits a tort while acting
within the ambit of his employment, the master is liable (vicariously) and must
answer to a third party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). See
Burks v. Christ Hospital, 19 Ohio St. 2d 128, 249 N.E.2d 829 (1975); Burns v.
Ellens, 459 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1970); French v. Fisher, 362 S.W.2d 926 (Tenn. 1962).
' 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955). There is no avoiding the implication
of the test by assuming that a right to control may exist even when unexpressed
by the superior party; "control" is an incident of contract, and contracts are built
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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no authority or right of control over them, can bind the hospital
by their negligent actions. See Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 101 N.E. 92, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 505.67
Justice Cardozo's rationale in the Schloendorff opinion, and the
Avellone court's apparent rationale in referring to it, was to point out
that two types of activity go on in hospitals: medical and administrative.
In the original Schloendorff opinion, Justice Cardozo held that hospitals
could not be held accountable for negligence done by medical actors.68
While the Avellone court cited the law as it stood, the Cooper court
erred in invoking Avellone as a basis for a control test, since the
Schloendorff opinion on which Avellone relied was expressly overruled
one year after it was decided (and fourteen years before Cooper)in Bing v.
6 9
Thunig.
In Bing, the physician-patient relationship was set out in a different light:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and
nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act
upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly
demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment.
They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual
workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action.
Certainly, the person who avails himself of hospitalfacilities expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility."0
The Bing court went further in its opinion to clarify exactly what the
rule of respondeat superior liability should mean in the context of
hospital services:
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities borne by
everyone else. There is no reason to continue exemption from
the universal rule of respondeat superior. The test should be,
for these institutions, whether charitable or profit-making, as it
is for every other employer, was the person who committed the
negligent injury-producing act one of its employees and, if he
was, was he acting within the scope of his employment."
67 27 Ohio St. 2d at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104, citing Avellone v. St. John's
Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 478, 135 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1956).
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). If the "administrative/medical" liability
dichotomy seems to the reader reminiscent of the "governmental/proprietary"
immunity dichotomy, it is probably not coincidental.
69 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
70 Id at 660, 143 N.E.2d at 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
Published by
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The distinction between the Bing test of respondeat superior liability
and the Councell test explains why the control test fails in medical
negligence cases. The Bing court repeatedly noted that physicians
employed by hospitals might subject the hospitals to liability for their
negligent acts if such acts were done within the scope of their employment. The Bing case never suggested that hospitals "controlled" their
physician-employees; rather, Bing looks to the incidents of employment,
much as the Restatement definition' 72of an independent contractor looks
to the incidents of "contractorship.
"Employment," by the Bing definition, has special connotations when
the employee is an emergency department physician. His employer is
not the patient he sees. In private practice, the doctor and patient might
come together in a freely-made contract which either might dissolve.
The physician is not bound, legally or ethically,73 to accept the patient.
In the emergency room, the patient has no choice which physician shall
aid him, and the physician must see any and all patients. The patient
does not solicit information about the physician's reputation; he looks
for a hospital which furnishes emergency services by means of the
physician. In the latter instance it appears that the physician is
employed by the hospital, and the patient is purchasing his services
from the hospital.
What has just been described is the alternate theory of liability for
emergency room malpractice cases, apparent authority." It should not
be confused with the Bing employment theory, which applies when the
72 "In determining whether one acting for another as a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among other things, are considered
...(a) The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)
over the details of the work.
(1957) (emphasis added).
11"A physician may choose whom he will serve ...[But] [h]aving undertaken
the care of a patient, he may not neglect him, and unless he has been discharged
he may discontinue his services only after giving adequate notice." JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5
(1971).
" When one actor deals with another actor, and a principal makes "manifestations to such third persons" (i.e., the first actor) as would create or change a legal
relationship between the principal and the "third person," the principal has clothed
the second actor- the agent, if you will- with apparent authority. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957). The reader will note that this definition does not
quite constitute an "estoppel;" indeed, agency by estoppel is distinctly different,
as this latter doctrine requires not only a detrimental change of position by the
third person, but also necessitates that the wronged party have reliance on some
proveable manifestations of apparent authority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 27 (1957). The confusion engendered here is made worse by the tendency
of the courts to blur the two ideas into one.
In the context of the present discussion, the merging of apparent authority
and agency estoppel doctrines is desirable, if not scholarly. The author reaches
that conclusion from considering that the usual concepts of master/servant and
principal/agent do not work in the medicolegal context, and it is useless to force 12
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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plaintiff can demonstrate-after the fact-some notorious exchange of
promises or money between physician and hospital. Apparent authority
applies when there is no obvious legal separateness between physician
and hospital. It follows from the facts in Cooper that an apparent
authority theory could be raised by the plaintiff. There was no indication that Dr. Hansen was not an employee of the hospital; and the
hospital, not Dr. Hansen, solicited the patient's business. There was no
suggestion that Cooper might obtain the services of other physicians,
and the fact that he saw Dr. Hansen was a result of a hospital decision
to grant Hansen privileges."5 Of course, it is obvious that a patient expects to find physicians in a hospital emergency room, and neither
knows nor cares whether they are independent contractors or
employees."6
The Cooper trial court did not address apparent authority directly,77
but the Ohio Supreme Court opined that an important element of that
theory was lacking:"6 The plaintiff did not make a showing of "induced
apparent authority and agency by estoppel into the same nonfunctional
framework. For the present discussion, then, the term apparent authority will
define the following situation: A third party (a patient) will seek treatment from
a physician; the patient will assume, based on demonstrable indications, that the
physician is an employee of X, the hospital. In fact, the physician may be an
employee of Y, or is self-employed. In a determination of whether the negligence
of the physician should be imputed to X, the trier of fact must determine (in addition to the usual proofs regarding the personal negligence of the physician)
whether the indications given the patient came from X; whether they were
reasonable so as to engender the conclusion; whether the patient relied on those
indications or elected to retain the physician based on those indications or
elected to retain the physician based on some other consideration; and whether
this construed to his detriment. In considering the latter two conditions reference
will be made to the "disclosure" test. See note 83 infra and accompanying text. If,
prior to making his treatment choice, it had been revealed to the patient that the
physician was in fact not an employee of X, but was self-employed (an independent contractor), would that revelation have made any difference? The disclosure
test is deceptive-it is susceptible of incorrect application because the courts
which have invoked it for medicolegal decisions have failed to put themselves in
the perspective of the patient who must make the choice. The court of appeals
decision in Hannola, however, represents a correct application of the test. Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 64, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (8th Dist. 1980).
" It is only by the mechanism of privilege that a physician is able to render
services in a hospital; absent this, he has no standing as a professional there. Only
the controlling body of the hospital may grant privileges, a fact which is easily
overlooked. Medical staff organizations may make recommendations as to an individual physician, but the statutory authority for operation of the hospital quite
plainly reserves this power to the governing body as a nondelegable duty. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.71 (Baldwin 1976); OHIO LEGIS. SERV. S-429 (Baldwin 1981).
70 Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 65, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190
(8th Dist. 1980) (the court may not disregard the human factors in considering
fact questions going to apparent authority).
7 27 Ohio St. 2d at 249, 272 N.E.2d at 100.
7AId at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
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reliance" which must be proven according to Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. 7 The Johnson court stated:
The doctrine of agency by estoppel, as it might be invoked by a
plaintiff in a tort action, rests upon the theory that one has been
led to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment. It is
not applicable where there is no showing of induced reliance
upon an ostensible agency."
The conceptual problem of detrimental reliance goes beyond the idea
that the plaintiff received negligent treatment at a particular emergency
room with an "ostensible agent" physician in attendance. The Cooper
court recognized this when it stated that there was no "induced
reliance" by the plaintiff. What the court seems to say is that if Cooper
knew Dr. Hansen was not a hospital employee, that knowledge would
have caused him to decide whether to stay and accept treatment or go
somewhere else. If this was true, there would be no detrimental reliance
on an ostensible agency, and therefore no grounds to rely on apparent
authority as a plaintiff's theory.
This scenario, however, bears no resemblance to the real world. Even
if the patient had a detailed explanation of the liability of hospital and
physician and a writing reiterating it,8 his decision to stay or go would
not reflect an objective choice. Even if the suffering and stress of the
moment could be set aside,82 he still would rely on the agency-ostensible
or factual-to his deteriment."
Classically, a plaintiff would not be able to invoke apparent authority

19141 Ohio St. 584, 49 N.E.2d 925 (1943).
" Id. (syllabus 4).
81 The reader may be sure, however, that in the hypothetical case there would
not be an attempt to get the patient to affirm the hospital's disclaimer of liability
as a condition to treatment; that sort of conduct is looked on quite severely by
the courts, as it should be. Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center of California, 60 Cal.
2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). See also Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258
Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1868) (where there is no alternative to the
care to be provided by a private physician, the provider cannot use that fact as a
basis for bargaining away his liability under a contract).
8 The court of appeals in Hannola opined that these concerns cannot be
disregarded by the fact finder, and also noted that they form part of the calculus
of a captive contract situation, in addition to being patently offensive to public
policy. 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (8th Dist. 1980).
11This construct is more eloquently set forth in the case of Gasbarra v. St.
James Hospital, 85 Il. App. 3d 32, 406 N.E.2d 544 (1979). The alternative choice
made available to the patient-that of leaving the emergency room and going to
another emergency room-is made not quite moot by the court. Realistically
(they assume), unless there is some ominous portent to the label "independent
contract," a patient would always elect to stay where he was. 406 N.E.2d at
554-55. This would seem to eliminate the doctrine of apparent authority as a
viable theory of liability in emergency room medical malpractice cases. However,
as will be apparent when the issue is considered in the context of the Hannola 14
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as a basis for recovery once he knew that there was no actual agency
between hospital and physician. However, in the emergency department
context, it is not the fact (quantity, if you will) of disclosure which matters, so much as the quality of disclosure. That is, the patient needs to
know whether the physician is competent to be a practitioner of
emergency medicine, what his physician-peers think of him and how the
hospital came to grant him privileges. Obviously, the hospital is not likely
to reveal that information even if it collects it. Similarly, the patient is
usually in no condition to make any but the simplest decisions-and a
comatose patient cannot make even those decisions. These facts suggest
that there will always be detrimental reliance on the hospital's
representations by an emergency room patient, because the hospital
will not provide him with the facts he needs to make an informed choice
of treating physicians, or because he is physically unable to make any
choice, and the hospital thus subjects him to the mercy of his choice of
health provider.
The Cooper opinion, in sum, reflects both an unwise use of the control
test in its discussion of employment relationships and a shallowness of
interpretation of the disclosure requirements of the apparent authority
doctrine. s4 It is not readily applicable to later cases, for the unincorporated association "employment" vehicle has given way to the professional association or corporation," for which general corporate prinfact situation, an important element is present in the calculus which is not considered by the Gasbarracourt.
What must be considered is what hospital "employment" implies to the patient. Simply put, if the hospital is perceived as being able to put an imprimatur
on the emergency room physician, disclaimer of employment status may suggest
disclaimer of imprimatur to the patient. In those instances, the patient would be
well-advised to seek other treatment, if he is able. The unfortunate fact is that
most of the cases on which the theory of independent duty of care to patients is
based have been precisely the type of situations where the hospital had resoundingly disclaimed any knowledge of the physician's ability. See, e.g., Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
8
There is no notion in the Cooper opinion that anything like the disclosure
test presented here was employed by the court, and it does not directly follow
from the Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. opinion. At best, the Cooper court's
inquiry into the question of detrimental reliance was superficial.
85 This is not to suggest that physician corporations are the only means by
which emergency services can be furnished by a hospital, although the corporate
form is certainly attractive. Teaching institutions, for example, rely heavily on interns and residents, who typically receive salaries for their labors and are thus
clearly employees. In the small, isolated hospital, and where professional corporations are either not permitted by statute or are not in vogue, the practice of each
staff member taking his turn "on call" persists. The disadvantages of this method
should be obvious; frequently, the physician is at home, or at least not physically
in the hospital, and in the time required for him to arrive a critically ill patient
might expire. There is also the very real problem that one might have a semiretired general practitioner dealing with a problem which is essentially surgical,
and which requires quick hands and a keen eye. The outcome could predictably
Publishedbe
by disasterous.
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ciples provide suitable decisional rationales.86 The members of the unincorporated associations, as staff members of the hospital, were subject
to the "control" of the privilege-granting function of the hospital,87 but
the fact did not alter the hospital's lack of responsibility for their
negligence. In contrast, the corporate form of emergency medical services would clearly seem to exempt the hospital from any physician
liability.88
The Cooper case stands as one instance where the bureaucratic structure between hospital and physician served to insulate the hospital from
liability for the physician's negligence. This result has been rejected in
some jurisdictions89 and upheld in others. A consideration of later cases
must also account for public policy considerations which have arisen and
the theory of an independent duty of care owed by the hospital to the
patient. To reach this point, we must first consider the most famous
medical negligence case of the twentieth century, Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital,"'the changes it produced in how hospitals view themselves, and what courts will expect of them as a result
of this case.

" Some such doctrines, like "borrowed servant," are not unique to corporation law, and were applied to malpractice cases before "corporate medicine"
became popular. E.g., Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957). Conversely, the appearance of the corporate form of practice may hasten the demise
of such artificial doctrines as "captain of the ship," (Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.
2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944)), which are as ill-suited to medical malpractice cases as
the control test of Councell. Unfortunately, the "captain of the ship" doctrine has
been revived in Ohio. Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 652, __ N.E.2d - (1982).
87 The question of whether the granting of privileges to a physician is
equivalent to hospital control (in the Councell sense) over the physician is best
deferred to the later discussion of the intercorporate contract in the Hannola
case, between the professional corporation furnishing emergency medical services and the hospital. In the author's opinion the analogy is one which strains to
achieve its goal, and for which better rationales could be substituted.
88 Consonant with this statement, of course, is the presumption that there
would exist no "holding out" situations so as to suggest apparent authority problems and an agency between hospital and physician. See note 74 supra and accompanying text. By way of illustration, if a hospital has operated a physical
medicine and rehabilitation unit, hiring one or two physicians, physical
therapists, and buying equipment, the entire department might remove itself
bodily from the building, set itself up under the corporate shield and otherwise
carry on business as usual. The hospital would no longer bear the burden of
liability for negligence in that type of treatment.
" Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hospital, 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970) (professional corporation).
Bulloch County Hospital Authority v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 183 S.E.2d
586 (1971) (partnership).
" 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149, aff'd, 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253

(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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THE DARLING CASE AND INDEPENDENT DUTY OF CARE

The apparent authority theory may permit a plaintiff to recover in an
emergency room medical malpractice case if he can show he did not
know the physician was not an employee of the hospital and if he was induced to rely on the ostensible agency between the two. This theory is
of no value if the patient knew that the two were separate legal entities.
The argument can be made, however, that this result is not quite fair
because the patient was not able to freely choose his physician, as he
would have been able to do in a private practice setting. The legal concept which embodies his social policy idea is that of an independent duty
of care. This means that in certain endeavors the hospital has a responsibility to act directly in the best interests of the patient, regardless of
what other relationships may exist between patient and physician, or
hospital and physician. Thus, the patient is to be protected from errant
nurses, 2 drug-addicted physicians,93 grossly incompetent surgeons94 and
ill-conceived experimentation. 5 While the concept of independent duty
of care does not seem to have a single origin, much of the interest in the
idea is traceable to the Darling" case. Curiously enough, it is in the
misinterpretation of the court's holding that the case has had its
greatest impact.97
The Darling facts are plainly gruesome. The plaintiff injured his leg
at a football practice and was taken to the Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital emergency room. A general practitioner-Dr. Alexander-was "on call" to that department and attended Darling. Dr.
v. United Hospital Center, 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977).
3 Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
9 Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228856 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Sacramento County,
Nov. 23, 1973), rev'd and remanded, Gonzales v. Nork, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131
92 Utter

Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and transferredto court of appeals for decision on the

merits, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
" Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373
(1967).
9133 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
" If the reader is not familiar with the medicolegal literature he may wonder
at the observation. However, it is a nearly predictable result for a case so widely
commented on. An attempt to list the articles it has engendered would be beyond
the scope of the present discussion; a good starting point, however, is the case annotation following a reprint of the decision at 14 A.L.R.3d 873 (1967).
The greatest source of confusion has surrounded the status of the defendant
physician, i.e., was he an employee of the hospital or an independent contractor?
According to plaintiffs counsel, he was a general practitioner taking his turn at
emergency room duty who was called by the hospital when young Darling was
brought in. Appleman, The Darling Case-A "Real" Tiger, 1975 INS. L.J. 714,
715. Recalling the example of previous cases, the hospital would not be liable for
the physician's negligence under a vicarious fault theory if employment is the
linchpin of vicarious liability. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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Alexander obtained an X-ray and determined that the plaintiff had suffered a fracture. Then, in violation of medical staff rules which required
consultation by emergency department staff in orthopedics cases,9" the
physician casted the injured leg and admitted the boy to the hospital.
Within hours after the cast was applied, the patient complained of considerable pain. The toes of the casted leg turned dark, swelled, lost sensation and turned cold. 9 Two days later the cast was removcd; a witness
present testified that "there was a stench in the room ...the worst he
'1°
The patient was transferred to
had smelled since World War IH."
another hospital, but, predictably, the leg had to be amputated below
the knee. The surgeon performing the amputation testified that the
cause of the "stench" and the attendant problems was gangrenous
degradation of the tissues of the leg, which occurred when circulation of
blood was cut off by the pressure of the swollen leg against the
unyielding plaster cast. 1'
Plaintiff proceeded against the hospital's nurses on a vicarious liability
theory, and against the physician on traditional negligence grounds. The
unique theories of the case, however, were advanced against the hospital in its own right. First, the hospital was alleged to have been
negligent because it failed to see that the nurses in its employ followed
care plans for fracture patients, by which the nurses were supposed to
report when an attending physician failed to take action to correct the
deteriorating condition of a patient.' Second, the hospital was alleged
to have been negligent because it failed to insist that the attending
physician follow the rules which the medical staff had compiled, which
required that consultation with a specialist be obtained in cases such as
0 3
The plaintiff did not allege an independent duty of care runfractures."
ning to the patient to be achieved by an independent monitoring of
physician quality of care, or by "peer review." ' 4
The hospital argued it was unable to prevent the tort, and that it was
powerless under the laws of Illinois to "forbid or command any act by a
physician or surgeon in the practice of his profession .... ,,"0 The best
Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
Id. at 328, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
100
Id.
98 33

"' Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
102 Id.
103Id.
'0' The mistake has frequently been made, and seems to follow from the
court's frequent use of terms like "failure to exercise adequate supervision" in
the opinion. It is only apparent after several readings of the opinion and by a
comparison with other materials which more fully illuminate the fact situation.
See e.g., Rapp, Darling and its Progeny:A Radical Approach to HospitalLiability,
60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972).
"0' 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
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the hospital could do, and the limit of its duty, it said, was to "use
reasonable care in selecting medical doctors. When such care in the
selection of the staff is accomplished, and nothing indicates that a physician so selected is incompetent or that such incompetence should have
been discovered, more cannot be expected from the hospital administration."' 6 As to the matter of responsibility for the misconduct of the
nurses, this was held to be attributable to the physician; when the
nurses followed the doctor's orders, the hospital could not control what
the former did."0 7
The trial strategy of the plaintiff in disproving these contentions was
deceptively simple. In essence, he argued that the hospital was licensed
by the State of Illinois, a member of the American Hospital Association,
and accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hos0
As a result of these affiliations, the hospital developed
pitals (JCAH)."'
106Id
107

Id

American Hospital Association is a trade organization admitting to
membership both short term (acute care) and long term (rehabilitative care)
hospitals; it sets out for its members hospital standards relative to physical
plant, safety and (minimally) personnel. The Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals ("Joint Commission" or "JCAH") is predominantly concerned with
quality of care within the hospital, and less with the physical plant. Membership
in the American Hospital Association is a prerequisite to Joint Commission
membership; in addition, a hospital seeking the initial accreditation of the Joint
Commission must demonstrate that it offers a wide variety of services to the
public, including emergency care, radiology, pharmacy, pathology and quality
care review. It must provide for the availability of other services, such as nuclear
medicine, if not furnished therein. Further, it must maintain a clinical service in
either medicine, obstetrics-gynecology, pediatrics or surgery (and if surgery,
anesthesia service as well). These last requirements are deceptively simple, for
they also require that the hospital have all the necessary backup in terms of
nurses, laboratory and special care units to support the clinical services.
A stated minimum of six full-time beds must be maintained, although it is an
extreme rarity that so small a hospital would qualify for Joint Commission accreditation since the economies of scale would make the setup unworkable. Initial
accreditation is usually accompanied by on-site inspection by Joint Commission
officials, who then issue an approval for two years, one year or deny approval. If
approved for two years, interim re-inspection by the hospital must be performed,
and the results submitted to the Joint Comission. Unannounced surveys may occur
at any time, and if a hospital is found "not in substantial compliance" with standards, approval may be revoked for a single service, or for the entire hospital;
this ban is effective for a minimum of six months, during which time the hospital
is supposed to correct its stated deficiencies. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 13-19 (1976).
When a particular clinical service loses accreditation, the effect on the medical
staff is chilling. Insurers such as Blue Cross and the Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement offices learn of the Joint Commission sanction very quickly, as the
decisions are made public in Joint Commission publications. This can prove to be
a great inconvenience for the patient; if he is admitted for elective care to an institution where Joint Commission approval has been suspended as to one service
(the
one furnishing his care),
Published by
EngagedScholarship@CSU,
1981 his insurer may elect not to pay.
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bylaws for its medical staff, a policy and procedure manual for its
nurses and certain internal rules of conduct. The avowed purpose of
these rules, and the justification for their existence under state law was
to improve the quality of care in the hospital. Since the state gave the
hospital governing body the power to permit its medical staff to write
its own code of conduct (bylaws), and gave other clinical departments
similar power, it was not unreasonable that the hospital should be required to see that its departments followed their own rules, and that it
should answer when a breach of these rules resulted in an injury to the
patient. 0'
The court of appeals affirmed an award for the plaintiff,"' and in its
affirmation of this decision the Illinois Supreme Court laid the foundation for much of the subsequent discussion of independent duty of care:
"The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable and
feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of
the patient."..
I Appleman, plaintiff's counsel in Darling, gives a glimpse into the defense
dilemma in recounting his examination of the Charleston Memorial Hospital administrator. See note 97 supra and accompanying text. If the administrator
denied that the nurses told him Darling's condition was deteriorating and untreated, then the nurses were at fault, and as employees of the hospital their
negligence was imputable to the hospital since it had been shown that extant
rules required reporting to the administrator of such occurences. If the administrator said the nurses did tell him, then he was at fault, and his negligence,
as an employee, was imputable to the hospital, since evidence had been adduced
that rules of the hospital required that he then inform the chief of the medical
staff, which he did not do.
110 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Ill. 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965).
1 33 Ill. 2d 325, 330, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965). The reader should particularly
note the phrase "and other responsible authorities," which refers inclusively to
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Id. In a preceding reference
to Joint Commission standards, the court observed:

In the present case, the regulations, standards and by-laws which the
plaintiff introduced into evidence, performed much the same function as
did evidence of custom. This evidence aided the jury in deciding what
was feasible and what the defendant knew or should have known. It did
not conclusively determine the standard of care and the jury was not instructed that it did.
Id.at 330, 211 N.E.2d at 257. Despite the language of the court, the standards of
the Joint Commission have been accepted as more than custom, and legitimatized
as decisional constructs. They are as much standards of care as the testimony of
physicians would be in regard to medical procedures, and it is unfortunate that
some courts have failed to recognize them as such.
The court's holding, "that a hospital assume certain responsibilities," must not
be seen as too sweeping. In the context of this case it meant that Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital must follow the rules which it had set up for its
own functioning, and which ostensibly provide quality care. The court did not in-
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Though the Darling court did not address the matter of hospital
liability for selection or retention of its medical staff of incompetent
physicians, this issue had been alluded to by an earlier Illinois decision.
In Dayan v. Wood River Township Hospital,"2 it was noted that
hospitals which were negligent in selecting staff members might themselves be liable if the physician injured a patient. " ' However, if the
issue of hospital liability for physician conduct was not reached by the
Darling court, it was certainly addressed by legal commentators. A
typical pronouncement of the extreme reformers was an observation by
Southwick:
The case indicates that the law should finally and forcefully reject the antiquated, rather meaningless notion that a corporation cannot practice medicine; the law should recognize that the
realities of modern medicine of highest quality require collective
concern and action. Institutionalization of medicine results in institutionalization of responsibility for the patient's welfare.'
Other writers were more conservative:
Darling v. CharlestonCommunity Memorial Hospital held that a
hospital's duty of care is to be determined not only by an examination of what other hospitals in the community do, but also by
reference to what the hospital says it should do in its by-laws
and in other standards applicable to the hospital." 5
In the interim between the Darling decision and the Hannola decision,
those reforms which have been made have not been so sweeping as suggested by Southwick, but they have been significant. Unfortunately,
reform has not prevented some singular cases of medical negligence and
incompetence, which have reflected a breach of internal hospital standards and dereliction of a duty owed to patients."'
validation and supervision. Later cases, building on the Darlingfoundation, have
held that hospitals should exercise this independent duty of care, but the reader
should note that Joint Commission standards relating to this duty have preceded
the courts into the area; holdings of courts have reflected the trend, not created
it.

112 18 Ill. App. 2d 263, 152 N.E.2d 205 (1958). The Dayan court was not the first
to propose this theory. In Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944),
the Colorado Supreme Court declared that no hospital could ever be liable for the
negligence of physicians, even if they were employees, unless "it employs those
Id. at 364, 149 P.2d at
whose want of skill is known, or should be known to it.
374.
"' Dayan v. Wood River Township Hospital, 118 Il1. App. 2d at 269, 152 N.E.2d
at 208.
. Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146,
161 (1968).
"' Rapp, Darling and its Progeny: A Radical Approach to HospitalLiability,
60 ILL. B.J. 883, 892-93 (1972).
16 One of these, Utter v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va.
Published1977),
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One case concerned an attempt by one Dr. Moore to regain privilege
revoked for incompetence. In Moore v. Board of Trustees of CarsonTahoe Hospital,"7 Moore, a Board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist," 8
sought to regain his medical and surgical privileges at the defendant
hospital. A district court denied his request, and the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the denial. 1 9 A series of events were involved in the
medical process which apparently culminated in Dr. Moore attempting
to induce spinal anesthesia in a patient while not wearing surgical
gloves-after repeatedly handling the needle with his bare hands.'
Two days later, he was barred from performing a scheduled operation,
and a hearing to cancel his privileges followed.
As in Darling, the court found that medical staff bylaws, established
by the hospital, governed the plaintiff's conduct. 2' Significantly, the
court went a bit further: "The delegated power to establish admission
standards for medical staff members impliedly includes the power to

ing multiple injuries, and his right arm was put in a cast from shoulder to hand.
Within forty-eight hours, his arm was "swollen, black, very edematous and that
there was a foul-smelling drainage emitting therefrom; that he maintained a high
temperature and was sometimes delerious." Id. at 215.
The treating physician was notified by the nurse, but he did nothing. At that
point, the nurses did not contact the chief of staff, although their nursing manual

required them to do so.
The West Virginia court had no difficulty attributing liability to the hospital,
noting that the hospital is charged with knowledge in the delivery of medical services. Id. at 216, citing Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d
754 (1965).
"I Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hospital, 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d
605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972).
11 "Board certified" in this discussion means that Dr. Moore had passed the
examination in clinical medicine given by the American Board of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Inc. This is not an inconsequential feat, and a physician who is Board
certified in a specialty is prima facie considered to be among the best qualified of
the practitioners in that speciality. The circumstances of the Moore case suggest
that his incompetence was induced, not that competence was never acquired.
495 P.2d at 606.
2 A dissenting opinion by two justices calls this an isolated incident, and
notes that "every professional man errs from time to time." They miss the point
of the "incident." Moore's act was so egregious that first year medical student
would know better than to do what he did. The likely outcome of his blundering,
for the patient, was bacterial meningitis arising from penetrating the spinal canal
with the contaminated needle. The fact that the patient did not succumb was due
either to Moore's failure to actually penetrate the canal, or, more probably, the
prompt administration of antibiotics by other physicians. DRIPPS, ECKENHOFF &
VANDAM, INTRODUCTION TO ANESTHESIA 78-81 (1977). The dissent's colloquy also
points to a major problem in medical negligence cases: the failure of lawyers to
adequately explain, and of judges to study, the medical facts and consequences,
prior to applying decisional rules to those facts.
2' See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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continue to regulate membership after admission."' 2 That this regulation meant individual monitoring of physician performance was not left
to speculation:
Today, in response to demands of the public, the hospital is
becoming a community health center. The purpose of the community hospital is to provide patient care of the highest possible
quality. To implement this duty of providing competent medical
care to the patients, it is the responsibility of the institution to
create a workable system whereby the medical staff of the hospital continually reviews and evaluates the quality of care being
rendered within the institution. 3
An extension of this idea appeared four years later in the Supreme
Court of Arizona. In Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch,'24 a hospital
sought to block discovery of a massive collection of incident reports and
medical review committee minutes concerning the repeated negligent
conduct of an anesthesiologist whose negligence, while under the influence of alcohol, caused the death of a plaintiff's wife. The action was
declined in lower court, and taken on appeal to the Arizona Supreme
Court, which remanded and ordered that discovery be allowed. 2 ' In
passing on the disquieting facts of the case, the court specifically noted
the utility and probative value of Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals regulations and their use in formulating rules by which a continuing quality review of physicians could occur. 12 6 If the medical staff
was negligent in seeing that the review process was implemented, or
that deficiencies in individual physicians were not corrected, then the
hospital was corporately liable for the negligence of the medical staff.'27
This judge-made rule, that the medical staff is the agent of the
governing body, was developing simultaneously in other jurisdictions. In
Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority,2 ' the Georgia Court of
Appeals made it clear that the governing body could not disassociate
itself from the medical staff on grounds of medical ignorance when questions of an independent duty of care to the patient arose. 9 Plaintiff took
her husband to defendant's emergency room after he complained of
chest pains. After a cursory examination, the physician on duty (not a
hospital employee) told the patient that his condition was not serious,
88 Nev. at 208, 495 P.2d at 607.
II at 211, 495 P.2d at 608 (emphasis added).
124113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976).
125

Id

"2113 Ariz. at 36, 545 P.2d at 960.
117Id. at 37, 545 P.2d at 960.
12"125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd sub nom., Mitchell County
Hospital Authority v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
1 186 S.E.2d at 209.
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and that he should return home. He did, but his condition worsened, and
he died within two hours. Plaintiff's wrongful death action was rebuffed at
the lower court, which granted summary judgment for the hospital. In
reversing for plaintiff, the court of appeals noted:
The Authority seeks to absolve itself from liability in that it
leaves the screening of candidates for the admission to the medical staff of the hospital to the existing members of said staff,
which is composed of doctors already admitted thereto. This is
not defensive, as these members of the staff are agents of the
Hospital Authority, and it is responsible for any default or
negligence on its part in properly selecting new members of this
staff.13
The Georgia Supreme Court, in affirming, formed that holding into a
test of liability for the defendant hospital:
If the physician was incompetent, and the Authority knew or
from information in its possession such incompetency was apparent, then it cannot be said that the Authority acted in good
faith and with reasonable care in permitting the physician to become a member of its staff. 3'
Having the medical staff as agent of the governing board was a concept adopted for osteopathic hospitals in Purcell v. Zimbelman'32 There
was strong evidence of notice of Purcell's incompetence as a surgeon; he
had been sued by four patients prior to the subject case, and all five actions concerned the same type of surgical error. 33 The hospital was accredited by the American Osteopathic Association which prescribed
that the governing board had to accept responsibility to select medical
staff members who "are professionally competent and will offer op134 There was testimony from outside experts
timum patient care.
and from a medical staff member that the custom in osteopathic hospitals so accredited was to establish review committees and examine
privileges, and to make recommendations on the termination or refusal
of privileges. The explanation offered in the case of the errant surgeon
was that two of his cases which resulted in suit had been presented to
the surgical review committee, but nothing happened and no recommendations were made to the governing body. Since the governing body did
not know about Dr. Purcell's propensity to be incompetent, they were
not negligent in failing to curtail or remove his privileges." 5 This arguI& at 307, 308.
S.E.2d at 414.
18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
13 Id- at 81, 500 P.2d at 340.
Id. at 83, 500 P.2d at 341.
1
Id. This argument had been advanced successfully in a similar case, Hull v.
North Valley Hospital, 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136 (1972), where the Montana
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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ment was rejected by the court, utilizing a theory similar to that used in
the Joiner case. 3 ' The medical staff, after all, was the agent of the
governing board, and they were to make recommendations on the qualifications of individual physicians. If they were negligent in making
recommendations, then their negligence was directly imputable to the
governing board.137
The Ohio Supreme Court was not unmindful of the trend toward a
new doctrine of hospital liability when it decided Khan v. Suburban
Community Hospital.38 The plaintiff had been a practicing surgeon at
the defendant hospital, but was advised his privileges would be terminated when new medical staff bylaws were adopted. There was never a
question of lack of competence on his part; his foreign medical training
made it difficult to gain admission to the certification examination which
would qualify for the new privileges. 139 He sued to regain his privileges,

but the trial court found that they had been removed via a proper hearing and the denial should stand. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that while the criteria imposed by the board were not unreasonable,
a test of outcome should override such criteria where, as in the instant
Supreme Court acknowledged that the governing body of a hospital could act to
curtail a physician's privileges; but the court also noted that the hospital's
governing body could not act unless and until it had been notified by the medical
staff. Absent such notification it was not negligent for the governing body to do
nothing.
13 Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. at 83, 500 P.2d at 341.
137 Id
A different approach to the question of medical staff negligence was
taken by the plaintiff in Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital, 138 N.J. Super. 302,
350 A.2d 534 (1975). As in the previous cases, the defendant physician was alleged
to have been grossly incompetent, and to have a history of negligent acts which
the hospital was aware of or should have been aware of. The unique feature of
the case was that the entire medical staff of the hospital-some 141 physicians-were joined as defendants by referring to them as an incorporated
association. This action engendered a veritable firestorm of criticism. See e.g.,
Note, Hospital May Be Held Liable for Permitting Incompetent Independent
Physician to Operate, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 177 (1977); see also Zaslow, A New
Reason for Liability: HospitalStaff Membership, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 20 (1977).

The case did not live up to expectations, however; the published proceeding
was a denial of an interlocutory motion to dismiss, and before trial the physician's
insurance company settled-therefore, the question was not passed on. See Horty
and Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Physician, 22 ST. LouIs U.L.J.

485, 487 (1978). These authors argue persuasively that the joinder of the entire
staff would never have worked, since the staff did not meet the requirements of
an unincorporated association. Id at 499. They also note that a claim based on
hospital liability for individual medical staff failure to recommend credential
changes is neither prohibited, nor unreasonable. Id. at 498 n.67.
45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 340 N.E.2d 398 (1976).
plaintiff had extensive surgical experience and training in the
English-speaking world, the American Board of Surgery would not let him sit for
the examination. Whether he would have passed it was never considered,
although it seems likely that he would have. This seems to represent less an atat assuring quality 1981
care than an attempt at "restraint of trade."
Publishedtempt
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case, plaintifff had satisfactorily performed general surgery for four
years at defendant's hospital."' In reversing the court of appeals, the
Ohio Supreme Court noted that the power of the governing body of the
hospital, which derives from statute, must be controlling:
The great weight of case authority in the United States is that a
board of trustees of a private hospital has the authority to appoint and remove members of the medical staff of the hospital
and to exclude members of the medical profession in its discretion from practicing in the hospital. And, the action of hospital
trustees in refusing to appoint a physician to its medical or surgical staff, or declining to renew an appointment that has expired or changing the requirements for staff privileges, is not
subject to judicial review.'
Significantly, the court, citing Darling and Joiner,recognized the reason
for this power: "[H]ospital governing boards are responsible for
42
upgrading the standards of health care to be maintained in a hospital."'
Thus, the Ohio court seems to have laid the groundwork for an independent duty of care doctrine with the recognition that hospitals must be
free to curtail the privileges of those physicians who cannot provide
quality care to their patients.
The latest case to expand independent duty of care also serves as an
example of the grossest type of hospital failure. In Johnson v. Misericordia
Community Hospital,' a surgeon applied to the defendant hospital for
privileges in orthopedic surgery. He listed several hospitals as
references; two had never heard of him, and his privileges had been
cancelled at the others. He was given full privileges at Misericordia
with no investigation by the hospital administration, and even became
chief of the medical staff. Plaintiff-patient sued the surgeon after he performed an operation on plaintiff's hip which resulted in severe damage
including permanent muscle atrophy.
The hospital's principal defense was that while it might have had a
moral duty to recruit competent medical staff members, it had no legal
duty to do so. The defendant-hospital cited provisions of the Wisconsin
Administrative Code which spoke to the ability of the governing body to
exercise its privilege function.' The court of appeals, sustaining a verdict against the hospital, was not impressed:

45 Ohio St. 2d at 44, 340 N.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 44, 340 N.E.2d at 402. This is not strictly true because the court made
it clear that any action to change a physician's privileges must conform to due
process requirements, and to the rules of the hospital. Id.
141 Id at 44-46, 340 N.E.2d at 402-03.
4 97 Wis. 2d 521, 294 N.W.2d 501 (1980).
14 Id at 530, 294 N.W.2d at 506.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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Misericordia consciously disregarded the welfare of patients
who came to the hospital for treatment. One of the basic tenets
of a hospital's existence is to provide optimal patient care. When
a hospital negligently fails to exercise reasonable care in selecting physicians for appointment to its staff, it fails in its responsibility to patients and violates the very purpose for which
it was established. Patients necessarily rely on hospitals to
monitor the quality of care rendered in their facilities.'45
This position is the pinnacle of contemporary thought on the responsibility of the hospital to the public. It is judicial recognition that a
hospital must make an effort to provide quality medical care since patients expect and deserve quality care from a hospital.
Darling makes clear that a hospital must follow its own internal rules
and guidelines in carrying out its duty to its patients. However, it has
since become evident that this alone will not suffice: An incompetent
physician could remain on the staff and harm many patients. The case
which proved that this could happen was Gonzales v. Nork.'46 In the
words of the trial judge, the case was a "Grand Guignol of horror."'47
The defendant-physician, Dr. John Nork, was not a drug addict, mentally
ill, or a sociopath; he was simply a horrible blunderer."'
The particular aspect of the case which startled medico-legal commentators was that the defendant hospital, operated by the Sisters of Mercy
of Sacramento, California, was a member in good standing of the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. For all the years that Dr.
Nork had been bungling surgeries, the Joint Commission had surveyed
and resurveyed the hospital, always giving it highest marks for quality

Id at 565, 294 N.W.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
...
See text accompanying note 94 supra.
147 The choice of words by Judge B. Abbott Goldberg, sitting as the trier of
fact, was unfortunately appropriate. In the course of trial, evidence was adduced
pointing to Dr. Nork's grossly negligent treatment of thirty-eight patients, on
whom fifty unnecessary operations had been performed. The human suffering
caused by him is staggering. Note, Hospital Liable for Surgeon's Admittedly
Unnecessary Operations,29 THE CITATION 18-19 (1974); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN
AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 216-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
PAIN AND PROFIT] (quoting the trial court opinion of Gonzales v. Nork and Sisters
of Mercy, No. 228856 (Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal., Nov. 23, 1973).
...PAIN AND PROFIT, supra note 147, at 217, quoting the trial court opinion of
Gonzales. The defense of drug addiction which Dr. Nork offered was overcome by
the testimony of his wife and seventeen co-workers who had both intimate contact with him and the training to permit them to detect such a problem. This
point is important to an understanding of the case: Dr. Nork was not substanceaddicted-he was a horrible incompetent, whose incompetence was known to
some who did not speak, and unknown to others who should have made it their
business to discover his faults.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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of care. 49 The adherence of Mercy Hospital to Joint Commission standards was never disputed. However, as Dr. Nork's full history of conduct unfolded, it became clear that compliance with these standards
could not itself serve as a defense.
In attacking the hospital's position that it had no basis to assume that
Dr. Nork would negligently treat the plaintiff,15 a group of thirteen
former patients of Dr. Nork were presented by Gonzales' counsel. Each
one had been needlessly operated on by Dr. Nork, and each left the
hospital in a worse condition than when he entered. In one case, a tissue
sample from the patient was noted by the hospital pathologist"' as "a
mass of white fibrotic material . . . 12 mm in diameter . . . bundles of

' The reader may imagine the effect that the case had on the Joint Commission. With its honor and reputation at stake, it sent a high ranking officer and nationally known surgeon, Dr. Reed Nesbitt, to testify at the trial about accreditation procedures. His testimony, unfortunately, confirmed that safeguards built into the existing surveillance programs were incapable of detecting incompetent
physicians like Dr. Nork. Id. at 229.
150 The position taken by the hospital becomes virtually transparent considering the facts of the Gonzales case, which resembled in many details other of Dr.
Nork's surgical misadventures. Mr. Gonzales was a gardener who consulted Dr.
Nork in November, 1967, with complaints of low back pain. After only a cursory
physical examination, Dr. Nork rendered a provisional diagnosis of what in lay
terms would be called a "slipped disk." He placed Mr. Gonzales in traction for one
week, which resulted in a dramatic improvement in symptoms-an outcome
which should have indicated that the provisional diagnosis was in error. Next,
although there was no justification for it, Dr. Nork ordered that a myelogram, a
special X-ray view of the spine, be taken. The radiologist who interpreted it
found absolutely no indication of a disc problem; Dr. Nork stated that he saw one,
and suggested surgery. When Gonzales declined, Nork alternately cajoled and

threatened him until he succumbed. The operation lasted longer than it should

have, and required far more blood than necessary, because Dr. Nork had to perform two ancillary operations for bone grafts to complete the repair of the
vertebral column. Mr. Gonzales' postoperative recovery was stormy and long,
and when finally discharged, he was in worse pain than when he first consulted

Dr. Nork.
Unhappily, the story does not end there. Mr. Gonzales could no longer work
because of his constant pain, and he came, in time, to distrust all physicians. As a

result, when he developed testicular cancer, he did nothing. When the pain of
that disease became unbearable, and he sought assistance, he had passed the
point where a cure could be hoped for. PAIN AND PROFIT, supra note 147, at

217-29, quoting the trial court opinion of Gonzales.
151 Since its inception more than twenty-five years ago, the Joint Commission
has included among the standards for pathology services that all tissue removed
from a surgical wound would be examined by a physician pathologist and a
diagnosis rendered to be entered in the patient's chart. This standard seems to
have originated as an early attempt to check unnecessary surgeries: If a tissue
committee saw that a surgeon was taking out too many healthy gall bladders, for
example, the suggestion might be made that he should employ greater diagnostic
acumen before recommending surgery. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 139 (1976).
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1.5.""2
Dr. Nork had cleanly severed one of the
myelinated nerve fibers .
main nerve trunks leading from the spinal cord to the voluntary
muscles, instead of performing his stated operation, removal of
vertebral bone to reduce pressure on the spinal cord.153 Despite the existence of a Medical Audit and Tissue Committee at Mercy Hospital
which was directed to report and review findings of "all tissue with
1 4
no
discrepancies between preoperative and postoperative diagnoses,""
action was ever taken against Dr. Nork. Indeed, there is no indication
that the Committee ever took notice of Nork's incompetence, even
though the Hospital's pathologist was repeatedly confronted with the
evidence. 5'
Drawing on the wisdom of Darling, Moore and Purcell, Judge
Goldberg found that Mercy Hospital had breached its duty to Mr. Gonzales by not removing Dr. Nork from its staff:.5 6

I have reached the conclusion that the hospital is liable with
great reluctance, because I am sure that the Sisters of Mercy
have done everything within their power to run a proper institution. But they, like every hospital governing board, are corporately responsible for the conduct of their medical staff."7

152

PAIN AND PROFIT, supra note 147, at 222, quoting the trial court opinion of

Gonzales.
153There was no objective indication for the operation. As with so many other
of Dr. Nork's patients, the myelogram was absolutely normal. Id.
154

Id.

If the reader finds this surprising, it should be noted that because of the
social and ethical dynamic of medicine, hospital society had developed complex
rules of behavior which render this kind of response from the pathologist not at
all unlikely. There is, as medical sociologists have pointed out, profound reluctance of physicians to criticize one another openly. This may be due in part to the
realization that every physician has committed serious, perhaps fatal, errors.
Consequently, any sort of "review" session, whether tissue committee or department rounds, becomes an exercise in diplomacy, not fact finding. The argument
to justify this conduct seems two-fold. On the one hand, staff members may seek
to keep an incompetent physician so that he does not admit cases elsewhere, where
others may not be able to cover his mistakes. On the other hand, there is really
no need to have "review" meetings because if the competent physician makes an
error, he will modify his behavior; if the incompetent physician errs, no amount
of criticism will change his actions. M. MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CUT 99-100,
130-33 (1977).
Ludlam, The Impact of the Darling Decision Upon the Practice of Medicine
15

15

and Hospitals, 11 FORUM 756 (1976).
151

Id. at 759. Mercy Hospital did not appeal the trial judge's decision, and as a

result of which it was to pay $2 million in compensatory and punitive damages.

Dr. Nork appealed on the question of whether his waiver of a jury trial had been
knowledgeable, and won a reversal and a new trial. 60 Cal. App. 2d 829, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 717 (1976). An appeal was taken by plaintiff to the California Supreme
Court, which reversed on the waiver issue, and remanded to the appellate court
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
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It is important to note that corporate responsibility does not mean that
the hospital is a guarantor of good results for all medical acts. What it
does mean is that the governing body must ultimately bear the responsibility for the shortcomings of its medical staff. The governing body
should prevent incompetent or marginally competent physicians from
obtaining or retaining privileges. 58'
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals was stunned
by the Nork case, and set about revamping its programs thereafter. The
pre-Nork Professional Education Program was replaced in 1974 with
the Performance Evaluation Procedure for Auditing and Improving Patient Care (PEP)."9 A subsequent reorganization in 1976 yielded the
Quality Resource Center (QRC), which consolidated auditing and training activities.' The impetus for new regulations culminated in a major
reorganization of the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, the source
document for Joint Commission compliance guidelines.' Included in the
regulations effective in April, 1976, were requirements that all physi12
cians in any department be members of the medical staff; that the
63
clinical activity of all physicians be subject to continuous review;' and
that such review extend to all departments, including emergency, outpatient, and home care services.'"' A significant regulation provides that
with directions to consider Nork's appeal only as to substantive merit. 20 Cal. 3d
500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
The failure of Mercy to appeal is apparently a calculated technique to see that

the findings of the trial court do not rise to the level of appellate court law. Note,
Piercing the Doctrine of CorporateHospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383,
386 n.16 (1980). Nonetheless, the actions of the hospital have proven costly. In
addition to a $500,000 payment to settle the Gonzales action, they have paid
$875,000 in settlement of six additional cases involving Dr. Nork, and made
guarantees of $3.65 million in eighteen others, in the event Dr. Nork's insurance
company does not pay. Id
I" The reader may wonder what the State of California was doing while Dr.
Nork was in practice at Mercy Hospital. The State of California did nothing. Dr.
Nork, in fact, was still in the active practice of surgery in Martinez, California, in
1976, even though the California Board of Medical Examiners had full knowledge
of all Dr. Nork's malpractice suits and the amount of damages which were awarded
after January, 1971. PAIN AND PROFIT, supra note 147, at 238.

A citizen of Ohio has, at this writing, virtually no statutory protection from
outrageous practitioners. The omnibus medical licensing bill which was supposed
to correct serious deficiencies in the Ohio Medical Board was defeated in a rush
to adjourn the 1980 legislative session. The Plain Dealer, Jan. 18, 1981, at 4-AA,
col. 1. As of April 1982, no remedial action had been taken.
'59 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, PERSPECTIVES ON AcCREDITATION, MAY-JUNE 1976, at 1.
IS Id
161 JOINT

COMMISSION

MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS

ON

ACCREDITATION

OF HOSPITALS,

ACCREDITATION

(1976).

Id. at 103.
at 108.
'
Id.
at 70, 111.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
162

SId.

30

1981]

HANNOLA v. LAKEWOOD

"[ejach member of the medical staff shall be qualified for membership,
and for the exercise of the clinical privileges granted to him."'65 It
should be apparent that such a standard, if applied, would have prevented the injuries described in Purcell, Nork and similar cases. The
Joint Commission has taken great pains to clarify this important standard:
[Tihe granting of such privileges is based on each individual's
current competence

....

Privileges should also be related to an

individual's documented experience in categories of treatment
areas or procedures and to the results of treatment, as shown in
patient care evaluation studies. ... [I]f based primarily on experience, the individual's credentials file should reflect the specific experience and successful results that form the basis for the
granting of privileges. '
The pertinent question is whether all these Joint Commission
guidelines and judge-made standards have improved the quality of
medical care in American hospitals. There is no simple answer. In
hospitals with a weak administrator and a strong medical staff, there is
probably no change from pre-Darling practices. Similarly, there is no
reason to improve care in the hospitals too small for Joint Commission
membership, which may not fall under any but the most cursory state
scrutiny.'67 The hospitals in this latter category can still qualify for
Medicare/Medicaid funding, but the main concern of that program is to
shorten the length of hospital stays to decrease costs; quality is a
secondary consideration.'68
65 Id. at 103. The regulation, while not new to the 1976 compilation, has
received increased attention.
'6 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, PERSPECTIVES ON ACCREDITATION, MARCH-APRIL 1976, at 1, 6 (emphasis added).
167 The conditions of participation for Medicare/Medicaid, set out in 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1901 (1980), provide that a hospital qualifies for benefits either by accreditation, if a member of the Joint Commission; by approval of a Medicare
surveillance team; or by certification by the state's hospital licensing authority

that the hospital is in substantial compliance with the Conditions of Participation.
The difficulty of qualifying through the latter route is obviously not great, and
not uniform from state to state.
168 The effectiveness of Professional
Standards Review Organizations was
studied in a joint project by the American College of Physicians, the American
Hospital Association, the American Society of Internal Medicine and the
American Association of Foundations for Medical Care. The study was underwritten and coordinated by the Kellogg Foundation. The results of the study

were sobering, but not unanticipated; as a quality assurance bureaucracy, the
PSRO concept was felt to be the best model yet formulated, but found never run
in a way to achieve even modest improvements in health care delivery. In addition, it does not reach into the consideration of non-Medicare cases, although that
was a hoped-for goal. FEDERATION OF AMERICAN HOSPITALS, 12 REVIEw 51, 53
(1979).
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It remains the responsibility of the courts to say what the duties of
hospitals shall be where the hospitals will not do so themselves." 9 This
is not an easy task. Some courts have declined to make public policy pronouncements about hospital duty, opting for noninvolvement. 7 ° In the
Hannola decision, the court of appeals took the higher road, and did
make a statement about what the patient should be entitled to. It is the
nature of the Hannola court's position, and the facts which gave rise to
it, which are now appropriate to consider.
V.

THE HANNOLA CASE-RESTATEMENT OF PATIENT'S RIGHTS

The facts of Hannola resemble many domestic emergencies. Prior to
March 19, 1976, the deceased, Paavo Hannola, enjoyed good health and
had no history of serious illness. "1 About the noon hour on March 19, he
experienced a sudden onset of dizziness, headache, and a feeling of
numbness in his right arm; his wife, Liisa, was so alarmed by these
symptoms that she took him to the emergency department of Lakewood
Hospital.172 He was seen sometime after 12:10 p.m. by Dr. Milton J.
MacKay, a physician-employee of West Shore Medical Care Foundation,
Inc. (West Shore), which was under contract to provide emergency room
physicians to Lakewood Hospital. As a condition of his employment with
West Shore, Dr. MacKay was a member of the Lakewood Hospital
Medical Staff.'
The nature of the physical examination given by Dr. MacKay is unclear; however, he apparently ordered skull and head X-rays."' Alleged19 This position is not inconsistent with cases like Kahn v. Suburban Community Hospitals, 45 Ohio St. 2d 39,340 N.E.2d 398 (1976), where the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that judges should not tell physicians how to govern themselves. Indeed, so long as quality of patient care is not adversely affected, courts have a duty
not to interfere, but the courts necessarily must invade the sanctity of hospital
bureaucracy when the governing body permits the medical staff to ignore its
general duty of care in such a way as to threaten public health and safety.
170 See, e.g., Hull v. North Valley Hospital, 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136 (1972).
17 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4, Hannola v. City of Lakewood, No. 80-804
(Ohio Sup. Ct., May 28, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees].
17 Lakewood Hospital is not-for-profit corporation owned and operated by the
City of Lakewood, Ohio. Affidavit of Duane Horning, Administrator; Brief of
Defendants-Appellants at 48, Hannola v. City of Lakewood, No. 80-804 (Ohio Sup.
Ct., May 28, 1980). At the time of this incident, it was classed by the American
Hospital Association, of which it was a member, as a general-medical surgical
hospital for short-stay cases of less than thirty days; it was also accredited by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and reported 11,282 admissions to its 382 beds with expenses of $1.9 million and a payroll of $1 million for
the 1976 reporting year. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO THE
HEALTH CARE FIELD 170 (1977).
172 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 171, at 2.
17

Id. at 4.
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ly, Dr. MacKay neither performed a neurologic examination nor reAbout 3:00 p.m. Dr. MacKay discharged Mr.
quested consultation.'
Hannola with a prescription for pain medication and advised him to see
his private physician.
Mr. and Mrs. Hannola returned home, but thereafter Mr. Hannola experienced what are described as "two grand mal seizures.""' Mr. Hannola was taken back to the Lakewood Emergency Room, and again Dr.
MacKay examined him. Dr. MacKay then asked Dr. Lehtinen, a stafff
neurosurgeon, to consult. The two decided to admit Mr. Hannola. Subsequently, Mr. Hannola became unresponsive and died on April 5, 1976.177
The available medical data indicated death was due to a ruptured saccular aneurysm."'
Mrs. Hannola, as executrix of the estate of Paavo Hannola, filed a
wrongful death action against Dr. MacKay, West Shore and the City of
Lakewood, Ohio, on January 26, 1977.' Her pleading alleged essentially
two theories against all defendants: (1) that they were negligent in
discharging her husband from the emergency department in the face of
his symptoms; and (2) that they were negligent in not calling for consultation when he was first seen in the emergency department.' These
acts were alleged to be below the anticipated standard of care for the
community of physicians and for an institution such as Lakewood Hospital.' In a supplemental affidavit of March 3, 1978,"82 plaintiff related
that she believed from all appearances that Dr. MacKay was an
employee of Lakewood Hospital.
Three arguments were raised by the defense in seeking dismissal of
the hospital. First, neither the hospital nor the City of Lakewood controlled or had a right to control Dr. MacKay or West Shore. Thus, there

175

Id.

176 1&
177

Id.

at 31, § 7. A saccular or "berry" aneurysm is a weakened portion of an
artery in the brain which has been distorted by the pressure of blood into a saclike configuration. If it bursts, blood is lost into the surrounding tissues and the
parts of the brain served by that artery are deprived of nutrients and oxygen;
hence, tissue death and brain damage follow.
The saccular aneurysm is a well-recognized medical event. Mr. Hannola's
symptoms at his first appearance in the Lakewood Emergency Department are
"classic" for this condition. Medical and/or surgical therapy may be employed in
treatment depending upon the condition of the patient, although it cannot be
assumed in retrospect that any therapy would have been effective. See
Neurological Surgery, supra note 37, at 1660.
I" Hannola v. City of Lakewood, No. 77-965635 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Jan. 26,
1977).
180Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 171, at 31.
178Id.

181

Id.

Id. at 33.
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was no arguable basis for vicarious fault, as both were independent contractors. 83' Second, the mere presence of Dr. MacKay at Lakewood
Hospital was not enough to make an apparent agency,'84 and liability
could not be imputed to the hospital,'85 since those elements that would
show an agency were not proven by plaintiff.' 8 The third argument, contradicting an independent duty on the part of the hospital to supervise
medical quality as a consequence of its state license to operate,'8 7 was
not dealt with directly, but was merged into the other arguments.'88 The
trial court granted defendant's summary judgment motion'89 and denied
plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint, 0 and in this posture the case
went to the court of appeals.' 9'
The court first dealt with the apparent authority question. 192 The
court pointed out that the plaintiff relied on the presence of the
' This question of master, servant and independent contractors is critical to
the case and will be discussed in detail below. For a general overview of the law
of agency in Ohio, see 3 OHIO JUR. 3d Agency and Independent Contractors § 153
(1978), for Ohio law on the control test referred to here. See also Clark v. Fry, 8
Ohio St. 358 (1858).
18 3 OHIO JUR. 3d Agency and Independent Contractors § 82 (1978).
185

The concept that mere presence does not connote apparent authority or an

agency relationship with the situs of action is the principal argument advanced in
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971), and was
relied on heavily by the Hannoladefendants. Brief for Appellant, Hannola v. City
of Lakewood, No. 80-804 (Ohio Sup. Ct., May 28, 1980), at 9, 10, 13. The court of
appeals did not reject this principle, but did not reach it in its decision. Hannola
v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
18 Apparent authority (sometimes referred to herein as agency by estoppel)
requires a showing of a holding out by a principal that an actor is the ostensible
agent of that principal; that a third party relied on this holding out; and that, consequently, the third party was damaged. The acts of the principal follow from common law doctrine that an agent cannot prove his own agency. Du Bois-Matlack
Lumber Co. v. Henry D. Davis Lumber Co., 149 Or. 571, 42 P.2d 152 (1935).
187 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.71 (Baldwin 1976) (hospital licensure).
188 The line of cases put forward by plaintiff advocate an independent duty of
care owed by the hospital to its patients. This is generally construed as a duty to
supervise staff physicians, and is articulated in the most famous of such cases,
Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228856 (Sup. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Nov. 27, 1973),
rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and transferred to
Court of Appeals for decision on merits, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1978).
189 Memorandum order of April 3, 1978.
190 Memorandum order of April 28, 1978.
'9' If true, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because such
ruling is proper only when no issues of material fact are in doubt. OHIO R. CIV. P.
56(C); Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 375 N.E.2d 46
(1978).
' In addition to the idea of detrimental reliance set out in Johnson v.
Wagner Provision Co., 141 Ohio St. 584, 49 N.E.2d 925 (1943), Ohio courts have
held that the omission of a party to act which engenders a notion of apparent
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Lakewood Hospital emergency room in her time of need, and that she
was not aware of the employment arrangements between West Shore,
the Hospital or Dr. MacKay prior to going to the hospital. Once there,
arrangements by either hosshe was not informed of the employment
913
pital personnel or Dr. MacKay.
The court subjected the ostensible agency allegation to the standard
of Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co."' Under this test, if goods or services
are obtainable at one location, from one and only one individual, in the
absence of proof of knowledge that the purveyor of goods is not an
employee of the establishment, the establishment owner is estopped
from denying agency. 5 This test is not strictly applicable to the facts in
Hannola, for it neglects the fact that the Rubbo customer could more
easily have gone elsewhere for goods than the Hannolas could have gone
elsewhere for medical care.
If the Gasbarrav. St. James Hospital9 ' disclosure test'97 is truly applicable here, the agency by estoppel contention seems without basis. That
is, if there was no express disclaimer, Gasbarra requires that the
knowledge which was not given-that Dr. MacKay was an independent
contractor-must have been a material misrepresentation to the patient
in order to find detrimental reliance, and consequently agency by
estoppel. If disclosure would not have changed the outcome,98 or if it is
deemed to be immaterial, there is not detrimental reliance.
Most courts, in passing on the question of apparent authority, have
not taken the position of Gasbarra.In Seneris v. Haas'99 the facts that
the defendant anesthesiologist worked at one hospital, obtained all of
his drugs from that hospital and was subject to on-call duty by that
hospital were enough for the plaintiff to make at least a prima facie
authority vested in an agent of that party in the mind of another party will suffice to make out a question of fact on agency for the jury. Luken v. Buckeye Parking Corp., 77 Ohio App. 451, 68 N.E.2d 217 (1945). The acts of the agent, however,
will not by themselves make out the apparent authority; there must be a
representation by the principal. Lodgsdon v. Main-Nottingham Investment Co.,
103 Ohio App. 233, 141 N.E.2d 216 (1956). Having permitted the manifestations of
apparent authority to occur, the principal is thereafter bound by them. Miller v.
Wick Bldg. Co., 154 Ohio St. 93, 93 N.E.2d 467 (1950).
" 68 Ohio App. 2d at 64, 426 N.E.2d at 1189.
114 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202 (1941).
Id. 1 of the syllabus.
19985 Ill. App. 3d, 406 N.E.2d 544 (1979).
1 See notes 74, 83 supra and accompanying text.
s Here, too, there is another public policy argument. Should a hospital be permitted to disclaim an agency with its emergency room physicians, if it could?
How would it be done? Verbal disclaimers, printed forms or signs would not be
enough. If the object was to return freedom of choice to the patient, there would
have to be advanced notice, which does not seem likely.
' 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
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showing of an agency relationship between the hospital and physician.
In other cases, a physician "director" of an emergency room, who was
guaranteed a minimum wage by the provider, was found to be an agent
of the hospital despite a specific contract disclaimer.0 0 The Maryland
Court of Appeals in Mehlman v. Powell"' used logic very similar to that
of the Ohio Supreme Court in Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co.2"' to hold
that a "full service" hospital which made no showing of separate legal
status between emergency physicians and the hospital was estopped
from denying an agency relationship.
These cases do not address the matter of disclosure-indeed, they
avoid it. If the requirement of detrimental reliance is actually necessary
to show an agency as in the Hannola case, however, it is demonstrable.
The deterimental reliance-or, by another name, the material misrepresentation-was not a failure to identify Dr. MacKay as an independent contractor. It was, rather, a failure to disclose what steps, if any,
the hospital had taken to grant him privileges such that he could practice there. Likewise, it was a misrepresentation to fail to disclose his
history of malpractice suits, if any. Further, it was a breach of duty to
represent that his presence was not influenced by pecuniary factors
which may have overridden the hospital's quality of care. There was a
manifold absence of information given to the patient. By the requirements of Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co.,2" 3 this failure
establishes an agency by estoppel, and provides the plaintiff with a
theory of recovery.
The strongest reason for making out an agency in emergency room
cases such as Hannola is, simply, public policy. The individual patient
has no way to determine qualifications of emergency physicians; he is a
captive consumer. He might never select a particular emergency facility
if given a choice. It does not seem just to permit a hospital to haphazardly
staff its emergency department and then disclaim any responsibility for
the physicians who practice there, when it is only by the grace of the
hospital that physicians' privileges to engage in such practice are given,
and when the hospital "solicits" for the patients who come there.
The defehie position on vicarious fault as a matter of the "employment" stitub *as next considered by the court. The hospital asserted
that since there was no right to "control" Dr. MacKay, ' there was no
200Mduba

v. Benedictine Hospital, 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).

20

281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977).

2

See note 198 supra and accompanying text.

" 141 Ohio St. 584, 49 N.E.2d 925 (1943), at 4 of the syllabus.
Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1953). If the court
could reach employment principles under Councell, they would have gone further
by relying on Sears v. Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 2d 157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972),
holding that a municipal corporation, owner of a hospital, is liable to third persons for negligent hospital employees.
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basis to assert vicarious liability." 5 This type of argument has been advanced in other cases; the premise is that the hospital is merely a conduit for the physician's work, and is not accountable for his
negligence."' An important factor which, regrettably, the Hannola court
did not consider, is that "control" has never been a factor of employment where physicians were concerned. In cases such as Lundberg v.
Bay View Hospital,"7 Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital,"°' Rush v. Akron
21"
General Hospital... and Koubeck v. Fairview Park Hospital,
the
negligence of physician-employees was imputed to the hospital with no
allegation, suggestion or fact of control of the physician by the hospital.
The Hannola court, utilizing the contract between the two corporations as a vehicle, created control by the hospital over the physician and
West Shore. 11 The court noted that Article 7 of the contract provided
that West Shore employees must be Lakewood Hospital medical staff
members,"' implying that this bargaining piece ceded power to the
hospital. However, since Joint Commission standards mandate such
membership,"' this hardly seems to be a concession. Such provisions are
customary in all medical staff bylaws, and mere hospital committee
membership by a physician is certainly not sufficient to establish
vicarious liability.
The court's discussion of the hospital's independent duty of care has
important precedential value; it found that this duty attached to the
power granted to the governing body by the state, which in turn was used
to grant or withhold privileges of physician members of the medical
staff.2" What was not stated, but what should be remembered by other
courts, is that the hospital's independent duty of care is discharged only
when hospitals abide by their own internal rules, including the Joint
Commission and Medicare/Medicaid standards. Thus, when the conduct
of a hospital is considered, attention must be given to its record of doing

" 68 Ohio App. 2d at 66, 426 N.E.2d at 1191. The basis of liability under the
control test is the ability of the principal to direct his agent toward or away from
the negligent situation. Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358 (1858).
' See, e.g., Moon v. Mercy Hospital, 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).
" 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963).
20 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960).
84 Ohio L. Abs. 292, 171 N.E.2d 378 (1957).
210 84 Ohio L. Abs. 585, 172 N.E.2d 491 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1960).
1 68 Ohio App. 2d at 68-69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
212

1&

213

JOINT

COMMISSION

ON

ACCREDITATION

OF HOSPITALS,

ACCREDITATION

MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 70 (1976). The standard predates the 1976 major ac-

creditation revision, and came about with the increased popularity of independent contractor emergency room groups.
"l4 See Kahn v. Suburban Community Hospital, 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 340 N.E.2d
298 (1976).
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what it said it would do. This amounts to a discarding of the "locality"
rule of hospital practice" 5 which courts have uniformly discarded in connection with physicians.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Hannola case is in the implicit
recognition that there are minimum attainable standards of hospitalbased care which are achievable and to which a hospital should be held
as a matter of public policy. It is not proper to make the hospital an absolute guarantor. Furthermore, it is incorrect to assume it should be
responsible for treatment rendered by a private physician to a private
patient, unless either an employee of the hospital was also negligent or
it knew the physician was incompetent. When the hospital creates the
health delivery environment-as in the emergency room-it removes
the element of free choice from the patient, and also forecloses any ability
of the patient to decline treatment (by virtue of the patient's own condition). Public policy demands that a hospital have a duty to provide the patient with the best medical care by all appropriate means including,
notably, adherence to Joint Commission quality review standards.
216
The court of appeals decision in Hannola
preceded another potentially
useful medico-legal doctrine in Ohio by a few months. In effect, this latter
pronouncement changed corporate director and trustee statutory obligations under sections 1701.59 and 1702.30 of the Ohio Revised Code. 1
"I5See generally Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146 (1968). A better rule of Ohio law for holding the hospital

liable for the acts of emergency department physicians is set out in Strayer v.
Lindeman, 68 Ohio St. 2d 32, 427 N.E.2d 781 (1981). Demised premises were
damaged by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by the landlord to
make repairs. Upon affirming an award for the tenant, the Ohio Supreme Court
noted that when one assumes a duty, either pursuant to statute, by voluntary
choice or as an exercise of public policy, it becomes nondelegable, and the actor
cannot shield himself from liability for its negligent performance. Id.
1' 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (8th Dist. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-804
(Ohio Sup. Ct., Sept. 12, 1980). The case was subsequently settled.
217 1980 OHIo LAWS, S.B. 174 (amending OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.59,
1701.63, 1702.30 and 1702.33, and enacting § 1702.301; effective Aug. 7, 1980). The
relevant sections for this discussion are the modifications to § 1701.59 (authority
of directors) and § 1702.30 (authority of trustees). Both code sections are identical
in the original and in the amended forms, except for the use of the word "director"
in § 1701.59 and "trustee" in § 1702.30. Accordingly, only the text of § 1701.59 will
be given here, with amending language in capitals:
(A) Except where the law, the articles, or the regulation require action to be authorized or taken by shareholders, all of the authority of a
corporation shall be exercised by OR UNDER THE DIRECTION OF its
directors. For their own government, the directors may adopt bylaws
THAT ARE not inconsistent with the articles of the regulations.
(B) [Old § 1701.59(B) deleted. New Section (B) added.]
A DIRECTOR SHALL PERFORM HIS DUTIES AS A DIRECTOR,
INCLUDING HIS DUTIES AS A MEMBER OF ANY COMMITTEE OF
THE DIRECTORS UPON WHICH HE MAY SERVE, IN GOOD FAITH,
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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These new laws afford relief for breach of corporate duty to those in
privity, namely, shareholders or members of nonprofit corporations.
They also set forth procedures and sources of information which must be
employed in "doing the corporate duty."2 '8 As such, they should guide
hospital administrators and trustees in their dealings with the medical
staff and in fulfilling their independent duty of care to hospital patients.
What follows are a few remarks on how those two aims may be effected,
in light of both Hannola and the revisions in the director/trustee liability
statutes.
VI.

CONCLUSION: HOSPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN OHIO

Guidance has been given to administrators and directors in the running of hospitals from the Joint Commission or Medicare/Medicaid stan-

IN A MANNER HE REASONABLY BELIEVES TO BE IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION, AND WITH THE CARE THAT
AN ORDINARILY PRUDENT PERSON IN A LIKE POSITION
WOULD USE UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. IN PERFORMING HIS DUTIES, A DIRECTOR IS ENTITLED TO RELY ON INFORMATION, OPINIONS, REPORTS OR STATEMENTS, INCLUDING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL DATA,
THAT ARE PREPARED OR PRESENTED BY:
(1) ONE OR MORE DIRECTORS, OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES
OF THE CORPORATION WHOM THE DIRECTOR REASONABLY BELIEVES ARE RELIABLE AND COMPETENT IN
THE MATTERS PREPARED OR PRESENTED;
(2) COUNSEL, PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, OR OTHER PERSONS AS TO MATTERS THAT THE DIRECTOR REASONABLY BELIEVES ARE WITHIN THE PERSON'S PROFESSIONAL OR EXPERT COMPETENCE;
(3) A COMMITTEE OF THE DIRECTORS UPON WHICH HE
DOES NOT SERVE, DULY ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH A PROVISION OF THE ARTICLES OR REGULATIONS,
AS TO MATTERS WITHIN ITS DESIGNATED AUTHORITY,
WHICH COMMITTEE THE DIRECTOR REASONABLY BELIEVES TO MERIT CONFIDENCE.
(C) [New section]
FOR PURPOSES OF DIVISION (B) OF THIS SECTION, A DIRECTOR
SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH IF
HE HAS KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE MATTER IN QUESTION THAT WOULD CAUSE RELIANCE ON INFORMATION, OPINIONS, REPORTS, OR STATEMENTS THAT ARE PREPARED OR
PRESENTED BY THE PERSONS DESCRIBED IN DIVISIONS (B)(1)
TO (3) OF THIS SECTION, TO BE UNWARRANTED. A PERSON
WHO, AS A DIRECTOR OF A CORPORATION, PERFORMS HIS
DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVISION (B) OF THIS SECTION
SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY BECAUSE HE IS OR HAS BEEN A
DIRECTOR OF THE CORPORATION.
218 Id
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dards," 9 not from case law or statute."' This is a deplorable situation
because expectations of care have surpassed legal requirements of care;
only recently has there been a conscious attempt to unite the two.
Despite some progress, however, the governing body has never been
given good policy on what to do with the medical staff. It is clear that all
power flows from the governing body ("board," for simplicity), yet no
one would suggest an authoritarian type of dictation to hospital physicians." ' At the same time, however, it is clear that a weak, "cosmetic"
board is worse than a strong one. Thus, if the institution is left to run
itself, monumental mistakes will inevitably occur.222 This type of laissezfaire attitude would also neglect the board's historic responsibility of
assuring quality care in the hospital.2
Many medical specialty organizations have their own set of standards, on
the theory that the demands of their particular calling require a special commitment to excellence by the hospital. Notable in this regard is the American Board
of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, Inc., which has waged a spirited campaign
against incompetent practitioners and inadequate hospitals.
There are a few notable exceptions to this generalization. See, e.g., STATE
219

OF OHIO,

DEPARTMENT

OF HEALTH,

PUBLIC

HEALTH

COUNCIL,

MATERNITY

HOSPITAL RULES (1974).

" See Andarsio v. Community Hospital, No. 1483 (2d Dist. Ohio, Oct. 31, 1980)
§ 3701.342 (Page 1980), provides the power to change physician privileges and thereby upgrade the quality of care available in the hospital).
See generally notes 35-40, 98-101, 150-55, 171-78 supra and accompanying
text.
Southwick, The Hospital As an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities
Change its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 437-38
(1972); Note, Hospital Credentials Committee, BULLETIN OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, AUGUST, 1963, at 3; Greenville Gas Co. v.
Reis, 54 Ohio St. 549, 44 N.E. 271 (1914); Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability,43 INSURANCE COUNSEL J. 110, 114 (1976). The hospital attorney can
be one of the strongest allies of the board if he counsels an honest approach to
responsibility, and an open profile, maximizing the public relations benefits of
quality care planning. He must also diplomatically meet any frontal attacks on
regulations by the medical staff, and avoid participating in any attempts to circuitously bypass legal responsibility.
One of the most striking examples of what not to do is set forth in Lescoe,
Regulation of Health Care by Medical Staff Bylaws, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 17 (Feb.,
1977). The author advocates "sanitizing" medical staff bylaws, so that future legal
action could not be aided by plaintiff's recourse to those bylaws, as was the case
in Darling.For example, if the bylaws said that consultation should be requested
under certain circumstances (as most do), those words should be stricken, to prevent use of the bylaws in a case where a consultation was not obtained and
damage resulted from that failure. Lescoe does not mention that this tactic has
been tried and it had failed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Tonsic v.
Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. 468, 289 A.2d 138 (1972), considered a case where a
surgeon had left an instrument inside a patient; there was a question of what preand post-operative instrument and sponge counts rules had been in effect. The
trial court instructed the jury that they could find against the hospital if they
found that the hospital negligently failed to make a prophylactic rule.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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Compromise seems to have been most often advocated by commentators in discussing the board's responsibility to the staff, because it is
likely that challenges will either lead to unseemly litigation22 or because
physicians who see how the board operates may appreciate the complexities of routine operation of the modern hospital.2 5 Also, cooperative
boards can more easily convince medical staffs to do their bidding,2 and
they make the unpleasant task of discussing self-policing somewhat less
odiousm - whether or not any action is taken.
The Hannola decision and the new Ohio director/trustee laws
threaten to change this pleasant relationship because they mandate
board participation in hospital quality assurance. Outside interference
in internal governance of a learned profession is certainly never
welcome. 28 Yet, not even the most narrow definition of "independent duty"
would deny the hospital's (and hence, the board's) fundamental role.
This Note disputes Lescoe's opinion, and believes that any hospital which attempts such obvious stonewalling is asking for trouble. A Joint Commission
hospital would lose its accreditation, and no hospital could prevail on the trial of
such a position.
"' Note, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting Staff
Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (1980).

" This may in fact be the wave of the future. Michael D. Bromber, Chairman
of the Federation of American Hospitals, stated that increased physician involvement in hospital governing bodies is "a definite check against abuse by nonprofessionals .. " Letter, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 233 (1981). The board-staff approach also avoids the problem of what the board says to the public about the
hospital, and what it actually does, as reflected by its position in litigation.
Leonard, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physician Malpractice, 15

L. REV. 953, 967 (1973).
1 Ohio law recognizes that an agent of the board is a useful and necessary adjunct, since the board cannot do all things itself. Mason v. Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275,
76 N.E. 932 (1927).
Warren, The Discipline of Physicians, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 43 (Sept.-Oct., 1974):
The conclusion is inescapable that the published records and reports offer
little to show that the house is being kept clean, and rather furnish considerable evidence that existing mechanisms are ineffective. What, then,
can be proposed[?]....
(Ilf the definition of professionalism includes deserved independence
and diligent self-policing, then the failure of existing mechanisms (to impress either the public or the members of the medical profession itself
with being effective) invites some critical self-study and organizational
self-improvement.
Id at 46.
28 Perhaps lawyers would appreciate the plight of physicians more if (1) the incidence of legal malpractice suits approached the true incidence of legal malpractice; (2) the "media" ran exposes on shoddy law offices; and (3) every year, every
lawyer's standing in his firm was reviewed by a committee of laymen, who could
vote to oust him from the firm. How quickly would a "fortress mentality" develop
under those circumstances?
' Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of HospitalPractices?,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452 (1978).
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One way of dealing with this new responsibility, of course, is to delegate
it. It has been argued that since only physicians know whether their
peers are competent, the board should be only a rubber stamp.130 This
leads to the theory that the medical staff should be responsible for retaining a negligent physician, or hiring an incompetent one, and that the
board itself should have no liability. 31
Reality commands this result will not obtain. The legislature will not
rewrite the laws, and power will not flow from medical staff to the board.
Public policy suggests that in those areas where the hospital appears to
be the primary provider of care-emergency, anesthesia and
radiology -direct board action to control and direct the medical staff is
long overdue. 3 Boards should utilize the new director/trustee laws as a
focus for a frank discussion with the medical staff. Both groups should
realize that their duties, enunciated more clearly than before, may not be
disregarded and will be examined by courts. If the board takes a
cooperative, active role in the process of medical staff review, the staff
may be inspired to do a better job out of a sense of competition. On the
other hand, if the staff seems less than enthusiastic with the board's
new role, they may be reminded that a failure to upgrade standards inevitably means financial losses for both the hospital and the staff.233
Regulation of Health Care by Medical Staff Bylaws, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 17 (Feb. 1977):
223 Lescoe,

Both medically and legally, the lay members of the governing board are
incompetent to pass judgment on the quality of medical care. It would be
best that the bylaws recognize this responsibility of the medical staff
under the laws of the state. This takes nothing from the governing
board. It also gives nothing to it to be used against the self-governing
staff at a later date.
Id. at 18.
Lescoe, an attorney and thoracic surgeon, makes a good point when he notes
that lay members are not as medically competent as physicians to judge quality
of care, but he regrettably overlooks the state of the law. No legislature grants
power to a medical staff, nor is it about to; all power flows from the board. Still,
he is correct to question competence of board members, which is a serious problem and which deserves attention. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
This Note favors the use of arbitrators in the board-staff fights, and the creation
of a recognized speciality of medical negligence law, just as admiralty or patent
practice is so recognized. Medicolegal practitioners would serve as arbitrators
and would probably do the bulk of malpractice and credentials cases. Of course,
those who oppose specialization will see this as a "restraint of trade," without considering whether medicolegal specialty practice should be freely attempted by all
attorneys, even against the best interest of their clients.
23

Note, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate HospitalLiability, 17 SAN DIEGO

399 (1980).
" Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 304 A.2d 61, 64 (Del. 1973).
23 The economic argument is perhaps the most convincing and least heard. If
physicians realized that hospital losses meant equipment and facilities lost to
them, they might be responsive to changes in medical staff governance.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/8
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Liasons to the medical association should be established, so that if a
complaint is filed with the association concerning a member, the hospitals
at which he practices would also be informed of the filing. These principles are not intended to be encompassing, nor are they in the ambit of
legal advice; but they certainly will not harm the hospital's liability
posture.
Changes that have occurred in medical negligence law have been made
by judges who realized that hornbook law does not give justice to the injured patient.234 These advances have evoked glowing predictions about
what might be done for the patient, and gloomy prophecies about the
future of the hospital. The "citadel" of the hospital has not yet crumbled
from the outside.23 5 If it falls, it will be from within, and it will come from

the lack of attention to duty of the governing board and the medical
staff.23 It is inevitable that courts must step in-as the court of appeals
did in Hannola-todiscard antiquated legal constructs which block an injured patient's path to a just recovery for his injuries. The courts must
23 Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital, 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970
(1978):
The experience of the courts has been that application of hornbook rules
of agency to the hospital-physician relationship usually leads to
unrealistic and unsatisfactory results, at least from the standpoint of the
injured patient. Consequently, we have seen a substantial body of
special law emerging in this area; the result has been an expansion of
hospital liability for negligent medical acts committed on its premises.
235On

the matter of the citadel crumbling, see Zamerski and Spitz, Liability of

a Hospital as an Institution:Are the Walls of Jericho Crumbling, 16 FORUM 225

(1980). These authors assume that hospitals are headed in the direction of enterprise liability, and must accept the risk for whatever happens within their walls.
The enterprise tort has some novel utility here, but this Note suggests it is
best reserved for those places where the hospital has actually conducted an
enterprise: radiology, anesthesia services and the emergency rooms. Note, The
Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of
Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385, 418 (1975).
23 This Note suggests that a governing body could have an easier time with
its medical staff if it followed some basic rules: (1) "Sanitized" bylaws or rules
should not be tolerated under any circumstances. (2) In review of credentials or
renewal of privileges, experience should not be confused with competence. Every
person experiences a diminution of skills with advancing age. It is unfortunate
when a practitioner has to be forceably retired, but it is sometimes necessary. (3)
The high risk areas of the surgical service, the intensive care units, and the
emergency departments deserve special attention. Since the physicians staffing
those services are likely to be more sensitive than others to the issue of quality
care, the discussions with them must be tactful, but firm. (4) If physician
members sit on credentials committees (as they should), none should be appointed
who furnish services to the hospital as members of a professional corporation.
The conflicts of interests are too great to be explained, especially at trial. (5) A
result census should be implemented among the staff, so that at any moment the
board may know who has been sued, for how much, the basis of the complaint and
the disposition of all such cases.
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put an end to parochialism in questions of medical negligence and
recognize that hospitals should be held to a single, national standard of
care which they have a paramount duty to achieve. The motivation need
not be entirely selfless. Judges, like all the rest of us, may sometimes be
hospital patients. As potential patients, we all deserve nothing less than
excellence.
DAVID A. BEAL*
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert E. Sweeney
Co., L.P.A., and Peter Enslein, Esq., for providing materials on the Hannola decision.
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